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[Civil Peace Forum] Ushering in an Era of Great Transformation on the Korean Peninsula through Citizen Participation

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[Civil Peace Forum] Ushering in an Era of Great Transformation on the Korean Peninsula through Citizen Participation

익명 (미확인) | 토, 2018/07/28- 12:45

Civil Peace Forum 2018-2 Peace Report

Ushering in an Era of Great Transformation on the Korean Peninsula through Citizen Participation

 

 

Lee Hyeuk-hee / Chairperson of Operation Committee, One Korea Action

 

 

Different Era Requires Different Thinking

 

At this very moment, the Korean Peninsula is entering a new era of great transformation. After the North Korea-United States summit following the inter-Korean summit in 2018, this great transformation is now the current of the times that no one can swim against. I refer to this development of events as a great transformation because this is an extraordinary time that is now unfolding: something none of us has ever experienced.

 

This great transformation can be specifically defined as “the end of the Cold War”, “deconstruction of a divided Korea”, and “the emergence of a new order on the Korean Peninsula” filling in the political vacuum left after the Cold War system has ceased or been aborted. The biggest shock and concern would be to witness the paradigm shift of “peace through national security” to “security through cooperation”. We have never experienced living in a world in which not guns but a collective security system and armies without a main enemy maintain peace. To adapt to this new situation will take quite some time. Deconstruction of a divided Korea will be even more shocking. If this division actually refers to a “hostility” derived from “regional division” and “different lifestyles” (See Lee Jong-suk, 1998), North Korea will gradually go through a transition into market socialism following its policy of accelerating marketization and focusing on economic development. This means expiration of the “different lifestyles”, and the hostility which arose from the hate for being different from one another will also very likely disappear. The only thing left then is the regional division. If Korea can maintain its de facto unification even though regional division is still in place, the national division, which has grown on its own and persisted for a long time only on the Korean Peninsula, can be deconstructed.

 

More importantly, however, is the matter of “recreation”. Paik Nak-chung pointed out that in terms of a reunification theory applicable to the Korean Peninsula, people must take the initiative and be creative in deconstructing the existing division. The key to this argument that reunification must be part of a recreation process is that an entirely new Korean Peninsula has to be created by overcoming the contradictions which exist in both South and North Korean society through comprehensive inner reflection, not by unifying the two societies without rectifying their own inconsistencies.

 

In May 27, 2018, at a press conference reporting on the second round of the Inter-Korea Summit, President Moon Jae-in remarked, “This is only a start. However, it is not anything that has been witnessed in the past. It will be a whole new beginning.” I assume that his emphasis is along the same line as what I’ve mentioned above. It is also worth noting Chairman Kim Jong Un’s words during the 2018 North Korea–United States summit: “It was not easy to get here. The past worked as fetters on our limbs, and the old prejudices and practices worked as obstacles on our way forward. But we overcame all of them, and we are here today,” adding that “the world will see major changes.” Chairman Kim’s remarks were originally made with the intent of ending North Korea’s hostile relationship with the United States, but they can be viewed as an indicator of the upcoming major changes within his country. As such, a tremendous opportunity for a great transformation of the Korean Peninsula through citizen participation has presented itself, at a time when the leaders of the two Koreas are willing to create a new Korea and are pushing forward with great effort.

 

What we must focus on now is determining how we can help this great transformation to happen with citizen participation and not political decisions made by our leaders. More precisely, the question is “How can we become creative in the process of recreation as a people, and go beyond the boundaries of grand decisions and visions put forward by the governments of South and North Korea?”

 

The Candlelight Revolution: A Starting Point for Great Transformation

 

To understand the trends within this great transformation and respond to them, we need to look at the fundamental factors that facilitated it. While there are many opinions and views on this issue, the undeniable fact is that Korea’s “Candlelight Revolution” was at its core. The previous administrations, run by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, pursued a strong confrontational policy towards North Korea which led to military crisis, instead of managing inter-Korean relations. This is a distinctive feature of the system of a divided in Korea in which South Korean leaders attempt to strengthen their political hold through a confrontational footing towards North Korea to gain and unite their supporters, supported by advisors who intend to prompt an economic collapse of the North and reunify through absorption. When peaceful everyday life was no longer possible in the two Koreas due to this fierce confrontation, Paik Nak-chung anticipated that a “citizen participation movement does not merely mean participation by citizens, but the inevitability of an ultimate change in the status quo, which is a call to change the anti-peace regime”. Indeed, this occurred in the Candlelight Revolution. As he reviewed these revolutionary processes, Paik remarked that “the Candlelight Revolution, which overthrew a regime that was against progress in inter-Korean relations was the best example of citizen participation I have ever witnessed.” Only afterwards, it became clear that “citizen participation” meant “voluntary participation of citizens” attempting to resolve a situation that disrupted everyday life, overthrowing a regime that fundamentally supported the system of peninsular division.

 

The current approval rating for President Moon shows that support for his administration comes from its success in bringing about peace on the Korean Peninsula by improving inter-Korean relations rather than removing deep-rooted irregularities or improving the economy. Civil society has played an especially important role in shaping favorable conditions for rapidly improving relations in 2018, at least according to the words of Chairman Kim Jong Un. During his opening remarks at the April 27 inter-Korean summit, Kim used the phrase “lost 11 years” and expressed hope that these lost years would not be repeated. Paradoxically, his remarks can be interpreted as North Korea being willing to dialogue with South Korea to improve inter-Korean relations, as the new regime in the South was put in place due to the success of the Candlelight Revolution.

 

The Starting Point for Great Transformation is to Institutionalize South-North Relations

 

Looking back at the June 15th (2000) North–South Joint Declaration, the administration headed by Kim Dae-jung adopted an “engagement policy” after abandoning one of confrontation towards North Korea, pushed by the previous administration of Kim Young-sam. This new approach was to rebuild trust between the two Koreas by promoting social and cultural exchanges and vitalizing economic cooperation mainly in the non-governmental sector rather than through direct government intervention. Engagement policy was shaped and influenced by the negative legacy effects of the worsening inter-Korean relations left behind by the Kim Young-sam administration. However, all the connections made between South and North Korea gradually disintegrated with the Lee Myung-bak administration and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in February 2016 by the Park Geun-hye administration. This brought the efforts by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations to improve inter-Korean relations back to square one. Certainly, it is difficult to understand how inter-Korean relations, which had seen 1 million South Koreans allowed to visit Mount Kumgang and 10,000 more every year to visit Pyongyang, had totally collapsed due to policy under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. This collapse shows the limits of functionalist approaches that focus on exchange and cooperation in a non-political arena, rather than those of engagement policy.

 

As for the Kim Dae-jung administration before him, the Moon Jae-in government was handed the legacy of negative inter-Korean relations. An anti-North Korean mentality was widespread among Korean citizens and theories of reunification through absorption or even of the uselessness of reunification were dominant in the related discourse. However, the Moon administration broke away from the past when the opportunity came and adopted a totally different approach. Its top-down approach is to rapidly normalize relations between South and

North and build trust through negotiation and dialogue between high-ranking government officials and then expand downward into exchanges in the non-governmental sector and economic cooperation.

 

This approach has many advantages. First, it promotes stability and sustainability of inter-Korean relations. It is unrealistic to expect Mount Kumgang tourism or the KIC to resume operations without first constructing mutual trust in a political and military sense, as the two Koreas were once at the brink of war. There will be no South Koreans, whether private citizens or business people, who would return to tourism or business with North Korea in the face of such instability. Second, the inter-Korean summit revealed that President Moon is focusing more on peace while Chairman Kim on reunification. Such a difference seems like déjà vu of the situation after the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration in which the South focused on implementing Article 4 of the Declaration, which promoted economic cooperation and social and cultural exchange, while the North focused on Article 1, which emphasized the reunification to be achieved by the two Koreas.

 

Unfortunately, there failed to be any further progress on implementing Article 2 of the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration, implementation plans for reunification, which was virtually the Declaration’s final aim, and here we are now. During the fourth inter-Korean

summit held in May 26, 2018, the two leaders sought to persuade the world that the two Koreas will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Or, they at least succeeded in convincing the world that they would institutionalize inter-Korean relations - in other words, a confederation of South and North would be achieved. This development was no less than a message that the two Koreas are acting at least towards the same purposes and goals. It is also clear that military tensions and adventurism between the South and the North will not be restrained without such institutionalization: a whole new approach.

 

The Citizen Participation Movement in a Special Era

 

In this era of great transformation, the members of the citizen participation movement have to find consensus on the details of reunification theory and then take the initiative to promote it widely, to ensure that people from all walks of life are the focus during this transformation.

 

When the limitations of the functionalist approach appeared, the argument that it was simply“pouring money into North Korea” gained prominence. This argument was an emotional, rather than scientific or rational, line of thinking as well as some kind of distorted “frame”, and defined humanitarian assistance and non-governmental exchanges as “forces against reunification,” assuming that any assistance to the North would help sustain the regime there.

 

However, this is simply based on the strategy of demonizing North Korea and promoting its collapse. But it held great sway among the population and some even became supporters of “reunification through absorption”.

 

To point out the flaws in this argument, we have to clarify the term “reunification”. In terms of overcoming the system of division, reunification is defined as “the process by which the vast majority of the people on the Korean Peninsula live under a better system than the current one”. According to this definition, it is “a gradual process that takes place over a long period of time” as opposed to what happened in Germany or Vietnam, where reunification occurred once, suddenly, after a preparation process. If reunification is viewed as a process and not a dramatic moment, it will be recognized as having a progressive form which is the sum total of different processes at several stages towards reunification, and not a finished form. In this case, reunification will be defined as a process in which the people seek the type of state that best suits their interests, and not instantly becoming a single-race nation.

 

Based on this, reunification will be further defined as a state in which the two Koreas help each other, visit one another, and coexist in peace - in other words, a state of being virtually reunified, not simply known as a single nation state. We define reunification as a “confederation” of the South and North, an institutionalized form of inter-Korean relations. Such a confederation will be reunification, and the need for reunification will now become more than just a reunion of one nation divided by foreign countries. The understanding of the word will be extended into a process in which the two Koreas, in recent history developing along two different routes, create a unified community in the interest of economic and security needs. A confederation means the South and North exist as two sovereign states for a certain period of time.

 

According to the principles upheld by the Basic Agreement of 1991, inter-Korean relations are distinct in that they exist inside one nationality and aim for reunification. While they are not relations between two different countries, it is also clear at the same time that a certain form of institutionalization comparable to international relations is needed for a certain period during which the two Koreas build a community and learn to coexist in peace. As the South and North have already accepted the idea of a confederation of two Koreas as the provisional form for reunification stated in Article 2 of the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration, they have to expand their scope of thinking through deep reflection.

However, a confederation of two Koreas is certainly different from the establishment of “a peace state”, an idea advocated by some in the peace movement that aims for peaceful coexistence. Under confederation, the Korean War will be declared over, which will mark the end of the Armistice regime, and a “peace agreement” discussed to regulate the state of peace on the Korean Peninsula as denuclearization proceeds. The agents responsible for observing such a peace agreement should be none other than the two Koreas. Although a series of events, including declaring the end of war and signing of a peace agreement will not be possible without guarantees from the US and China, the major foreign participants in the Korean War, the central responsibility for maintaining the regime of peace on the Peninsula will lie with the North and South themselves. The North-South Confederation will be a very inter-Korean organization to uphold the peace agreement proposed in the National Community Unification Formula, and agreed in the June 15th Joint Declaration. This confederation should not posit a permanent state of peaceful coexistence as its end goal; it needs to be situated as a tool of a peace regime aimed at reunification. The peace state and the North-South Confederation have fundamentally different purposes: the former the maintenance of peace, the latter reunification. Of course, the two Koreas are not the only actors in the peace regime on the Peninsula. It goes without saying that a system of cooperation and security must be built that encompasses not just Northeast Asia but the entire continent. But even this is only meaningful to the extent that the two Koreas participate as responsible parties and garner international support for reunification, and should not serve as grounds to perpetuate the state of partition.

 

The North-South Confederation will serve to accelerate the integration of the two communities with the goal of establishing a regime of peace aimed at reunification. The natural sequence of integration under such a Confederation would be to start with the establishment of an economic community, moving on to a socio-cultural community, and then culminating in a political community. The Korean people have witnessed the Panmunjeom Declaration and the fourth inter-Korean summit meeting. If the fifth summit meeting, scheduled for the Fall of 2018, also materializes, this would enable a new discourse that conceptualizes reunification as “de facto reunification in the form of a North-South Confederation” to firmly take root as part of the discourse on reunification. Once reunification undergoes such a concept transformation among the population, it should be possible to open a new era with a major transition through the participation of the people, free from the shackles of the old idea of reunification through absorption. For the moment, there is also dire need for a national campaign to explain the meaning and content of the Panmunjeom Declaration and the Singapore Declaration. Informing the people of the content of these declarations alone can go a long way toward spreading the new conversation on reunification and accomplishing civic participation in an era of major transition. There is an urgent need to organize speaking events nationwide at the city, district, and town level to inform people of the coming of this era, with the aim of securing the participation of at least 10% of the population.

 

Next, the campaign to build civic participation must work toward involving the people who took part in the Candlelight Revolution in inter-Korean exchanges and realizing solidarity with the North Korean people.

The late Reverend “Late Spring” Moon Ik-hwan was the first to advocate solidarity between the people of the two Koreas after partition of the Peninsula. The 1994 initiative known as the “70 Million Compatriots in Preparation for Reunification” embodied this idea. Solidarity between the people of North and South Korea will not be an impossible dream once a North-South Confederation is institutionalized and de facto reunification becomes reality. Achieving solidarity between the people of the two Koreas, in particular, is a challenge that the South Korean civic movement must tackle. Rather than blaming past governments for “the lost 11 years”, the civic movement must come to terms with the failure of inter-Korean exchanges and peace movements to attract mass participation. In particular, the direction and aim of inter-Korean exchanges were not informed by the concept of civic participation. Exchange programs,although numerous and frequent, have mainly involved organizations and prominent figures,failing to draw general participation and taking root in people’s everyday lives. Now that the Candlelight Revolution has given rise to a new opportunity, the participants in that Revolution must take part in the new era of peace, prosperity, and reunification on the Korean Peninsula.

 

However, those who got out for the Candlelight Revolution are for the most part people who had not been born or become interested in such things before the “lost” 11 years. Should we try to explain past inter-Korean exchanges, they will not understand, and neither would they be won over to that same framework of inter-Korean exchanges. It is apparent that we need a new way of relating to them, a way which befits a new era. For civic participation to become a grassroots movement, such a new way of relating to people in North Korea is sorely needed.

 

People living in the North are not the same as before, either. The new generation since the“March of Ordeal” are known to have a completely different outlook than those before them. Snacks and other food products recently manufactured there apparently have the phone

numbers of manufacturers printed on them, sometimes even bar codes and QR codes. This suggests North Korean people are on the cusp of exercising their “consumer rights”, often deemed the most basic of all human rights. News reports even have it that the most popular

food manufacturer in North Korea, Gold Cup Athlete General Food Factory, boasts that average people test all its products prior to launch. These are signs that confirm, while not the immediate arrival, at least the potential for the Fourth Sector, or civil society, to emerge in North Korea.

 

What will the citizen participation movement for reunification do, if things change so dramatically, if, for example, railways and roads are connected and Mount Kumgang tourism resumes in earnest through an inter-Korean summit? The answer is that it must focus on

building solidarity between the people of the two Koreas. The idea of creating a new relationship has to be reexamined in earnest if a desire exists to keep up with the changes in both South and North Korea.

 

The present donation campaign for the people of North Korea is the most telling example of efforts to overcome the system dividing Korea - in other words, a reunification movement pursued in everyday life. The campaign was lauded as the most significant self-help movement of the Korean people since the Dangun era. Every organization took part as it unfolded at every municipal level (cities, districts, and towns) as the first donation campaign for the North.

 

Finding success in forming new relations will depend on whether the existing exchanges in different fields expand and create a new movement of popular exchange with a wide range of participants. Such efforts will only bring about real change as opportunities arise out of the Candlelight Revolution. Certainly, what is important here is that these efforts should not be one-sided. The new movement of exchange has to take the distinctive features of North Korean society and the position of its regime into consideration and establish a scope that is within what North Korean society can accept. In this regard, the “Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office”to be established in Kaesong is the most crucial route. Civil society must assume the responsibility for preparing to establish solidarity between the people of the two Koreas in everyday life through this Office. To this end, a network for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation is needed. Such an intermediate support organization would include a variety of Candlelight Revolution participants and “regular” citizens hoping to form new relations and grassroots organizations. The network would first need to introduce to the public assistance projects for North Korea. Second, it would coordinate and rearrange overlapping projects.

 

Third, it would offer educational programs on peace and reunification to alleviate possible culture shock that can arise from contact with North Korean society. Fourth, it will need to come up with strategic projects to build solidarity between the two cultures.

A special era calls for a special method of movement-building. The only mission civil society needs to accomplish is to exacerbate the current trends ending the Cold War system - something made possible by the Candlelight Revolution and its citizen participants - and to finally end the system dividing our peninsula.

 

 

* This essay is the second essay written for the 2018 Peace Report Project of the Civil Peace Forum, under the sponsorship of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Korea Office.

 

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UN 사회권위원회 최종권고, 그 의미와 실현방안

UN 사회권규약위원회 4차 최종견해 평가 및 이행방안 토론회

 

취지와 목적

2017년 10월 내려진 UN 사회권위원회의 한국 정부에 대한 최종권고와 관련하여, UN 사회권위원회의 심의 과정에 참여한 국가인권위원회와 NGO들이 사회권위원회의 심사와 최종권고의 의미를 공유하고, 핵심 권고를 중심으로 각 정부 부처의 이행계획과 실현방안을 확인하는 자리를 마련하고자 합니다.

 

토론회 개요 

  -주최: 국가인권위원회, 홍영표(더불어민주당 환경노동위원회), 노회찬(정의당, 법제사법위원회), 권미혁(더불어민주당, 보건복지위원회) 국회의원, UN사회권심의대응 NGO모임

  -일정 : 2017. 11. 20(월). 09:30-13:00   

  -장소 : 국회 제1소회의실 

 

토론회 순서

<개회식>

  -사회: 정연걸 국가인권위원회 사무관

  -인사말: 이성호 국가인권위원회 위원장

  -축사: 참석의원 및 주요인사

 

<세션1. UN 사회권 규약 제4차 최종견해에 대한 평가>

  -좌장: 이경숙 국가인권위원회 상임위원

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  -발표2: UN 사회권위원회 제4차 최종견해 분석 및 향후 과제-국가인권위의 대응을 중심으로 | 이동우 국가인권위원회 국제인권과 사무관

 

<세션2. 포괄적 차별금지법 제정과 사회보장권 개선 방안>

  -좌장: 신혜수 UN 사회권위원회 위원

  -발표1: 포괄적 차별금지 및 성소수자 인권 개선 방안 | 류민희 희망을만드는법 변호사

  -발표2: 사회보장권 개선방안 | 박영아 공익인권법재단 공감 변호사

  -토론: 이준일 고려대 교수 | 법무부 인권정책과장 | 보건복지부 복지정책과장

 

<세션3. 노동권 보장 및 기업의 인권이행의무 실행방안>

  -좌장: 조영선 국가인권위원회 사무총장

  -발표1: 노동권 보장 방안 | 류미경 민주노총 국제국장

  -발표2: 기업의 인권이행의무 강화 방안 | 나현필 국제민주연대 국장

  -토론: 강성태 한양대 교수 | 고용노동부 국제협력담당관 | 산업통상자원부 해외투자과장

목, 2017/11/09- 14:56
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참여연대 2014년 3차 정기 자원활동가 모집

참여연대 2017년 3차 자원활동가 정기 모집 안내 

  • 신청기간 : 2017. 8. 17(목) ~ 8. 29(화) (13일간)
  • O.T 일시 및 장소 : 8. 30(수) 오후 4시, 참여연대 2층 아름드리홀 >> 찾아 오시는 길 안내  
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[모집인원] 1명

[업무] 노란리본 발송 작업 (포장 및 발송)

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                                           <저녁반> 18:30 ~ 21:00 (2시간 30분) 

사법감시센터

[모집인원] 1명

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[활동기간 / 주기] 9.6 ~ 12.27 (약 4개월) / 주 1회, 4시간 
 

아카데미 느티나무 
[모집인원] 각 2명씩
[업무] 강좌 준비와 운영 지원, 후기 작성 
[활동기간 / 주기] 아래 강좌별 일정 참고 / 주 1회, 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (4시간) 
[지원 강좌]  (* 각 강좌 제목을 클릭하시면 자세한 내용을 보실 수 있습니다.)
- <나는 왜 쓰는가 - 세상을 바꾸는 다른 글쓰기>  :  9. 4 ~ 9.18 / 매주 (월) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (3회)
- <시대의 경계를 넘은 여성들> :  10.16 ~ 11.20 / 매주 (월) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (6회)
- 김명환의 <혁명과 전쟁의 세계문학 : 20세기 후반기> :  9.7, 10.12, 11.9, 12.7 / 월 1회 (목) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (4회) 
- 한상희의 <헌법, 진보적 삶으로 읽어내기> :  9.5 ~10.17 / 매주 (화) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (6회) 
- 김만권의 <정치철학으로 읽는 그리스의 비극 2> :  10.11 ~ 11.15 / 매주 (수) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (6회)
- <성장과 분배, 두 마리 토끼를 노려라> 이정우의 문재인 정부 경제정책을 향한 제언 :  9.25 (월) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (1회)
- <근육을 만들자> 김민식 피디의 즐거운 삶, 유쾌한 투쟁  :  10.26 (목) 저녁 6 ~ 10시 (1회)

[참고 사항] 20대 청년 및 학생 우선 배치, 해당 강좌에 관심이 많으신 분, 강좌 전체 참여 가능한 분
                  ※ 아카데미 자원활동가에게는 수강료를 받지 않습니다. 

 

>> 자원활동 신청하기 <<

 

○ 기타 안내

 - 참여연대 자원활동은 무급 활동입니다.  

 - 활동 종료 뒤 요청하시면 활동증명서를 발급해 드립니다. 

 - 신청하신 분야에 지원자가 많을 경우, 활동 부서 및 업무가 조정될 수 있습니다. 

 - 자원활동가 분들은 오리엔테이션에 참여해 주셔야 하며, 부득이할 경우 개별 연락 부탁드립니다. 


* 문의 : 참여연대 시민참여팀 02-723-4251 [email protected] 

목, 2017/08/17- 11:12
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#카드1

작년 11월 12일 우리가 서있던 곳은 청와대담장으로부터 900미터 앞

그날은 집시법제정 이후 처음으로 사직로 율곡로 행진이 가능했던 날이었죠

 

#카드2

청와대 앞 900미터까지 행진은 어떻게 가능했을까요?

 

#카드3

11월 9일 사직로 율곡로를 거쳐 청와대 에워싸기 신고

 

#카드4

경찰은 또다시 집시법12조 근거로 사직로율곡로 행진을 금지함

 

#카드5

11일 오후 주최 측, 오전 법원에 집행정지 가처분 신청 -> 13일 오후 법원, 집회행진 막지마라 결정-> 촛불시민, 사직로율곡로 행진

 

이과정은 대통령 박근혜 탄핵일까지 반복

 

#카드6

집시법12조 주요도시 주요도로의 교통소통을 근거로한 집회금지 조항은 지금도 살아있습니다.

 

#카드7

국회는 집시법 개정으로 주권자 국민의 촛불혁명에 화답해야 합니다.

촛불의 추억3으로 이어집니다.

 

 

 

 

 

월, 2017/11/13- 21:06
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법인세 왜 올려야 하는가

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가-1

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 2

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 3

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 4

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 5

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 6

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 7

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 8

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 9

 

법인세 왜 올려야 하는가 - 10

 

1. 법인세 왜 올려야 하는가

 

2. 감세정책은 성공?

 2008년 이후 법인세율은 인하

 가계소득 비중 줄고 기업소득 늘어

-가계(05년 : 64.8% → 16년 : 62.1%)

-기업(05년 : 21.3% → 16년 : 24.1%)

 

3. 그런데 세금은?

 그러나 소득세 대비 법인세 증가 미미

 (05년 → 12년 → 14년)

-소득세(24.7조 → 45.8조 → 53.3조)

-법인세(29.8조 → 45.9조 → 42.7조)

 

4. 그리고 양극화는?

 같은 기간 동안

 양극화 심화로 소득 격차 확대

 (소득 1분위와 10분위 차이)

-599만원 → 831만원 → 864만원

 

5. 현재 법인세는 높은편?

 실제 기업이 낸 실효세율(2017)

-미국 : 34.9%

-프랑스 : 32.4%

-독일 : 27.0%

-일본 : 27.3%

-OECD평균 : 21.8%

-한국 : 18.0%

 

6. 현재 법인세는 높은편?

 기업의 실질적 세 부담인 총조세부담률(2015)

-프랑스 : 62.7%

-일본 : 51.7%

-독일 : 48.8%

-미국 : 43.9%

-OECD 평균 : 41.3%

-한국 : 33.2%

 

7. 활발했던 법인세 인상 논의

 19대 대선 당시

-민주당 : 500억 초과 25%

-바른정당 : 200억 초과 25%

 2017년 세법개정안

-2,000억 초과 25%

 

8. 그렇다면 법인세를 올려야 하는 이유는?

 

9. 저부담 저복지인 한국 사회

 조세부담률 & 복지지출비중

-프랑스(28.5%, 31.5%)

-독일(22.6%, 25.3%)

-미국(19.7%, 19.3%)

-일본(19.3%, 23.1%)

-OECD평균(25.1%, 21%)

-한국(18.0%, 10.3%)

 

10. 증세없는 복지는 허구

 복지확대를 위한 증세는 불가피

 법인세 인상은

 기업소득이 늘어난 상황을 

 감안하면

 인상이 아니라 정상화로

 자연스러운 정책방향

 

11. 법인세 인상을 통해 복지국가에 한 걸음 더 다가갑시다

 

 

수, 2017/11/22- 13:15
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법원, 대통령 관저로부터 600미터 떨어진 청와대 연풍문 앞 백일장도 집시법 11조 위반으로 판결


청년참여연대, 박근혜 전대통령 상소문 백일장 개최 경찰 금지통고 취소소송에서 패소  
 “청와대 외곽담장” 이 아닌 별도 설치된 “대통령 관저 담장” 구분하면서도 소극적 판단한 법원 

 

 

서울행정법원 제14부(재판장 김정중 판사)는 청와대 인근 연풍문 앞에서의 대통령에게 보내는 ‘상소문 백일장’을, 집시법 11조의 대통령관저 경계로부터 100미터 이내 집회 금지 조항 위반이라고 판단했다. 이는 지난 11월 참여연대 집회와 시위의 자유확보 사업단(단장 한상희 건국대 교수)이 경찰의 청와대 연풍문앞 상소문 백일장 금지통고가, 집회의 자유의 본질적 요소인 장소선택의 자유를 제한하는 위헌적 법률에 근거하고, 집회의 규모, 시간 등을 고려하여 최대한 합헌적으로 해석 가능함에도 일률적이고 기계적으로 적용하여 집회의 자유를 침해한 것이라며 제기한 취소소송을 법원이 기각한 것이다. 또한 법원은, 현행 집시법 제11조의 “대통령 관저” 경계 지점으로부터 100미터 이내 집회 금지규정은 6만평이 넘는 전체 청와대 부지의 외곽 담장으로부터 100미터 이내로 해석해 청와대 앞 집회를 전면 금지하는 것은 집시법의 관련 규정을 잘못 적용한 것이란 주장도 받아들이지 않았다. 


작년 10월 청년참여연대 회원들은 당시 국정농단으로 국민들의 지탄을 받던 박근혜 전대통령에게 올리는 상소문 백일장을 청와대 인근 연풍문 앞에서 개최하려다 경찰의 집회금지통고를 받았다. 집시법 제11조의 “대통령관저의 경계지점”으로부터 100미터 앞 집회시위 전면금지 조항 위반이라는 것이었다. 이에 참여연대는 대통령 관저 경계로부터 100미터 이내에서는 2인 이상의 그 어떤 집회도 전면 금지하는 집시법 11조는 위헌적 법률이고 따라서 이에 따른 경찰의 금지통고는 위법하고, 이 규정의 대상이 되는 집회도 그 규모나 개최일시, 양태 등을 보고 최대한 합헌적으로 적용할 수 있는 가능성이 있음에도 이를 간과한 것은 집회와 시위의 자유를 침해한 것이라며 금지통고 취소소송을 제기하였다. 특히 “ 대통령 관저”는 ‘청와대’ 그 자체가 아니라 청와대 내부 별도 담장을 통해 구분되어 있으며 이로부터 100미터를 훨씬 넘는 연풍문 앞에서는 이 조항이  적용되지 않는다고 주장했다.


집회의 장소선택은 집회의 성패에 결정적인 요소이고 집회의 자유의 본질적 내용이다. 이를 침해하는 법률 조항은 위헌이다. 위헌적 법률에 근거한 처분은 위법하다. 또한 집시법11조에서 대통령관저로부터 100미터 집회를 금지한 것은, 대통령의 기능, 안녕보호에 위해를 가할 위험이 인정되는 옥외집회시위를 금지하기 위함인데 “백일장”은 누가보아도 이와 같은 위험을 초래할 집회가 아니므로 이 조항의 적용대상이 아니라는 것이 참여연대의 주장이다. 그러나 법원은, 2인 이상의 집회시위는 예외없이 무조건 금지하는 집시법 11조가 위헌적이라는 주장을 받아들이지 않았다. 대통령의 기능과 역할을 보호하기 위해  그보다 덜 침해적인 방법이 명백하게 존재한다고  볼 수 없다고 보았다. 비록 현재의 청와대 구조 특성상 법률에서 제한하는 대통령 관저가 아닌 대통령 집무실로부터 100미터 이내의 집회시위도 제한되는 결과가 발생하지만 크게 문제가 되지 않는다는 입장이다. 이는 집회와 시위의 자유가 헌법이 보장한 기본권이며 눈앞에서 명백히 존재하는 위험이 있을 때만, 그것도 가장 덜 침해적인 방법으로 제한해야 한다는 헌법적 요청을 간과한 것이다. 


법원은 집시법 11조 ‘대통령관저의 경계지점으로부터 100미터 이내 금지’ 조항을 2인 이상의 모든 집회시위에 적용하는 것이 아니라 집회의 규모, 성격, 그 개최 시기 등을 고려해서 입법취지에 맞게 적용해야 한다는 주장도 받아들이지 않았다. 이로써 1심 재판부는, 헌법에 합치되는 법집행의 의무가 있는 국가기관이 청와대 담장 앞 100미터내라는 이유로 2인이상의 집회라면 그것의 형식이 어떻든, 규모의 대소에 관계없이 기계적으로 예외없이 전면 금지하는 것은 문제가 없는지에 대한 판단을 끝내 하지 않은 것이다.


한편, 법원은 대통령 관저는 ‘청와대 외곽담장’안에서 대통령 집무실 등 다른 업무시설과 구분되어 별도로 담장이 설치되어 있어 그 담장으로부터 ‘청와대 외곽담장’까지 거리는 이미 100미터를 넘는다는 참여연대의 주장을 인정하였다. 그러나 “대통령 관저의 경계지점”을 청와대 외곽담장 안에 별도로 설치된 대통령 관저의 담장으로 해석하면 어차피 ‘청와대 외곽담장”  안에서는 옥외집회,시위가 불가능하므로 집시법 11조의  “대통령 관저”의 경계지점으로부터 100미터 집회금지 조항을 둘 이유가 없다며 청와대 외곽담장으로 보아야 한다고 판단했다. 이는 법조문이 아무 의미없이 있을 리가 없으며  조문이 있는 한 억지로라도 거기에 맞춰 현상을 해석해야 한다는 태도와 다르지 않다. 참으로 프로크루테스의 침대를 연상케 하는 태도가 아닐 수 없다. 참여연대는 항소를 통해 합헌적 해석을 통해 기본권을 보호할 의무를 저버린 1심 판결의 부당성과 집시법 11조의 규정  ‘대통령 관저’ 에 대한 명확한 의미를  다툴 예정이다. 

 

보도자료 [원문보기/다운로드]

월, 2017/08/14- 16:43
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