OECD 글로벌 최저한세, “혼합접근법(Pillar Two)”에 반대한다

1.     한국의시민사회는, OECD가 제안한 통합접근법(Pillar One)과 마찬가지로 “글로벌 최저한세(Global Anti-Base Erosion: GolBE)의 혼합접근법(Pillar Two)(안)”에 대해 불필요한 회계규칙과 과세소득 배분규칙을 호도함으로써 정상가격마저 떨어뜨려 멀쩡한 과세표준마저 도려내려고 한다고 판단하는 바, 이에 강력한 항의 의사를 전달한다. 당신의 이런 제안은 미친 소리로 들린다.

• 항의서(Pillar One): [CCEJ] Comments by Korean Civil society (En) Rev.2
• 항의서(Pillar Two): 191202 [CCEJ] Comments by Korean Civil Society

2.     혼합접근법은 오히려 쓸데없이 새로운 복잡한 문제들과 관할다툼만 들춰낼 뿐 하등의 관계조차 없기 때문에, 우리 시민들은 모든 수준에서 그 어떤 혼합접근법들(*1안 전세계 혼합; 2안 조세관할권 혼합; 3안 법인실체 혼합)을 도입하려는 OECD에 충고를 않을래야 않을 수 없다. 왜 간단한 문제를 쓸데없이 복잡하게 만들려는 건가? 괜한 짓 하지 마라. 통합접근법과 마찬가지로 저따위 혼합접근법은 모든 국가에―정상가격을 초월해―과세소득이 배분되어야 한다는 당위적 오류와 독립법인으로서 모·자회사간 지켜야할 이전가격 수준을 초월해 회계적으로 “투명한” 실체가 될 것이라는 거짓전제에 기초한다. 그렇게 함으로써, 통합재무계정을 활용하지 않으면 마치 BEPS(소득이전을 통한 세원잠식) 대응 프로젝트가 실패할 것 마냥, 비용절약 측면에서 그 어떤 회계기준을 준수하면 성공의 필요조건이라도 될 것처럼 혼합접근법을 밀어붙이려는 것으로 보인다.

하물며, OECD는 그 조차도 완전히 잘못 생각하고 있다. 일반적으로, 회계의 정상가격이 불투명할수록 이전가격세제의 유효세율도 그만큼 낮다는 것은 주지의 사실이다. 우리가 연결재무제표를 통해 소득이전과 이전가격을 그렇게 손쉽게 구분하고, 그러한 연결회계기준을 통해 이전가격세를 추산하고 과세표준이 그렇게 단순화 될 것 같았으면, 애당초 우리 모두가 다국적 기업들의 조세회피 문제에 대해 이처럼 염려할 일도 없었다. 이러한 까닭에, 회계규칙 상 (불)특정 과세대상의 영구적 과세손실에 대한 추정배제 기준이나 일시적인 과세손익에 대한 세무조정 방법을 상정해 3가지 혼합접근법들 중 그 어떤 과세권의 범위 수준에서 과세권자 마다 제각기 다른 과세대상과 과세소득을 모수로 혼합하여 이따위 기준과 조정 방법에 따라―분모를 빼거나 조작하는 방식으로―유효세율을 높여 향후 국제사회가 합의할 글로벌 최저한세율(*추정치: 아일랜드 법인세율 “12.5%” 수준)에 보다 가까이 접근함으로써, 국제거래의 정상가격 산출방법을 통해 확보할 수 있는 기존의 세수마저 축소시키려는 이 혼합접근법의 궁극적 성공 혹은 실패 자체를 논할 하등의 이유조차 없다는 것이다. 이런 방법의 기대와 결과에는 큰 차이가 있으며, 그것은 허황된 꿈이다.

3.     물론, 변수들을 줄이기 위해 하나의 세테리스 파리부스(ceteris paribus, 독립변수통제) 조건으로서 국제회계기준(IFRS)과 같은 단일 기준으로 통제해야할 필요성을 인식한다. 그러나 그 어떤 회계규칙들이나 배분규칙들이 아니라, 단지 우리 모두에게 필요한 것은 지역관할이나 시장관할 내 비물리적실재(즉, “영업소의 부존재”)에 대한 과세권능이다. 바로 그것이다. 전세계 디지털 경제 관계의 사실과 온전히 일치하는 비물리적실재에 대한 새로운 질서와 규칙에 따라 소비지국과세원칙에 근거하는 과세권 하나만 그냥 주기만하면 된다. 적어도 이 한 가지는 확실하다. 무형자산 평가와 디지털세 부과를 위한 단일한 과세권능이나 과세표준이 없다면, 현 정세는 지적재산권 이전과 소득이전에 맞서 일촉즉발의 고세율경쟁과 세수침탈의 과세전쟁으로 치닫게 된다는 것이다. 이것이 바로 지금 이 순간까지도 우리가 BEPS의 대응과 도전에 고민해왔던 이유이기도 하다.

구글의 역외탈세 구조 (이른바, “Double Irish with Dutch Sandwich: DIDS”)

4.     특히, 지적재산권 이전과 이전가격의 조작의 결과가 소득이전을 통한 세원잠식임을 역설한다. DIDS의 복잡한 구조에 관한 가장 까다로운 관심사 중 하나는, “구글”과 같은 다국적 IT기업들의 지적재산권 역외 이송에 의한 이전가격들이 미국과 아일랜드, 네덜란드에 걸쳐 전세계 독립 자회사들의 계열(지배)관계에 연결돼있다는 점이다. 이러한 사실에도 불구하고, 글로벌 최저한세 과세표준에 대한 결정방식과 정치적 편견으로 인해 내부자 거래나 자회사간―지적재산권 거래이전의 대가로 발생한 로열티(특허권사용료) 소득의 이전에 대해서 불특정 과세대상의 영구적 과세손실로 인한 세무조정의 추정배제가 마치 불가피한 예외기준으로 삼아 연결손익―의 절충 가능한 상계―즉, 이를 “면세” 대상으―로 취급해버림으로써 결국 과세소득의 대상으로서 포착하지 않으려는 OECD의 그런 의도 때문에 더욱이 우려스럽다. 마치 당신네들은 그들의 회계장부에서 이것들을 고의로 누락시키려 하고 있다. 따라서 지적재산권의 이전가격세제에 대한 공정한 세금징수, 그리고 일시적차이와 영구적차이 간의 예외원칙 배제나 적용 기준에 대한 편견없는 투명한 잣대로서 지적재산권 이송을 통한 소득이전 문제를 공정하게 다룰 것을 촉구한다.

5.     그 무엇보다도, “제조업”은 글로벌 최저한세 과세표준의 대상에서 제외되어야함을 재차 역설한다. 글로벌 최저한세의 과세표준은 무형자산을 주력으로 하는 다국적 IT기업들로 한정돼 있기 때문이다. 제발 착각마라! 국제사회의 디지털 경제 과세 논의의 핵심은, 시장소재지에 고정사업장이나 물리적 실재가 없더라도 다국적 IT기업들의 클라우드나 가상 플랫폼을 매개로 자유자재로 국경을 넘나들며 소비·판매·거래되고 있는 각종 데이터, 정보, 서비스 등 무형자산을 통해 조세피난처에 이전된 법인의 소득에 대해서도 국제조세체계의 형평성에 상응하도록 적정 세금이 부과되어야 한다는 것이다. 그들은 저세율국들의 제도상의 허점을 너무나 쉽게 악용하고 있다. 이에 우리는 그들의 세원잠식과 소득이전에 대응하기로 합의했던 것이다.

그런데, 무형자산을 주력으로 하는 IT산업과 달리, 물리적 실체가 존재하는 유형자산을 주력으로 하는 소비재 제조업의 경우 현지공장에서 생산된 제품들의 소비판매에 따라 발생된 해외법인의 영업이익에 대해서는 실질과세의 원칙에 따라 현지 세법과 국제조세체계와의 형평성에 걸맞게 적정 세금이 대다수 부과되고 있기 때문에 세원잠식이 문제될 이유가 없다. 또한 현지공장에서 생산된 제품들의 국제거래에 따라 발생된 해외법인의 이전소득에 대해서도 현지 관세법과 국제통상체계와의 형평성에 걸맞게 적정 관세가 대다수 부과되고 있기 때문에 이 또한 문제될 이유가 없다. 그럼에도 불구하고, ‘다국적 IT기업들의 무형자산과 독과점으로부터 발생되는 조세회피’와 ‘글로벌 제조업의 가치사슬체계, 즉 분업·생산·분배 구조에 따라 이전되는 소득’을 동등한 것으로 간주하여 디지털세와 마찬가지로 최저한세의 과세소득으로 삼는 것은 이중과세와 보복관세의 논란을 부추길 우려가 크다. 이러한 맥락에서, 국제경제체제를 뒤흔드는 나라들의 조세관할권 분쟁이 다른 나라들에 대한 세수침탈과 국제사회의 세수확보를 악화시킬 것을 심각하게 우려하고 있다.

6.     그러므로, 글로벌 최저한세의 과세표준을 IT 외 다른 영역으로 확대해선 안 된다. 그러한 왜곡으로 인해 디지털 기술 제조업과 소비재 제품·판매 일반으로 확산되어 소비자 기반을 위축시킬 것이기 때문이다. 예를 들면, 자동차, 가전, 스마트폰 또는 반도체 산업과 같은 소비재 기술 제조업을 디지털세와 최저한세의 과세표준으로 삼는 “소비자 대면 사업” 과세대상 영역으로부터 엄격히 불리해야 한다는 것이다. 다국적 IT 기업들이 갖는 무형자산의 효율성으로 생긴 영업이익과 제조업 유형자산의 비용절감노력으로 얻은 영업이익을 동일하게 취급하는 것은 불합리하다.

7.     결국 유형자산을 주력으로 하는 다른 다국적 기업들의 유형자산을 글로벌 최저한세의 과세표준 결정기준에서 제외시키지 않는 한, OECD의 최저한세 제한과 노력은 규제비용을 단순화하고 줄이는 데 실패할 수밖에 없습니다. 왜 구태여 멀쩡한 다른 기업들의 과세표준까지 건드려 더 복잡하게 만들려합니까? 이 건전한 납세자들까지 범죄자로 취급해선 안 됩니다. 다국적 IT 기업들과는 다릅니다. 따라서 디지털세와 마찬가지로 최저한세의 과세표준을 개발하려면, 다국적 IT 기업들의 무형자산만을 특정 대상(즉, Carve-outs)으로 지정해야합니다. BEPS 프로젝트의 첫 시작점은 지적재산권의 이전가격세제 문제를 극복하여 정상가격에 따라 이러한 무형자산들에 대해 과세할 수 있도록 개발하자는 것입니다. “원인이 없으면 결과도 없다”는 말처럼, 우리는 문제의 원흉만 효과적으로 제거하면 됩니다. 즉, 역외탈세에 대한 인과응보(因果應報). 이것이 BEPS 프로젝트의 고유한 목적입니다.

8.     행운을 빕니다!

191202 [CCEJ] Comments by Korean Civil Society

문의: 경제정책팀/국제팀 02-766-5623

█  UN 디지털다자협력 거버넌스 수립 및 비전 권고를 위한 설문조사 실시

설문조사 참여하기 ☞ https://forms.gle/FXn1UTLcc6L1p9Vn9 (클릭)

1. 개요

디지털 인권 및 경제 이슈를 중심으로, UN 디지털 다자협력체제(거버넌스) 수립 방안에 관한 설문조사 실시

2. 목적

– UN 디지털다자협력 비전 권고(안) 설정 및 제시를 위한 인식 조사
– 우리 정부가 시급히 대응해야 할 국내 디지털 이슈를 설정하고 문제해결을 위한 향후 정책과제 반영 촉구

3. 대상

– 민주 시민이면 누구나 참여 가능
– 관련 산업계, 학계 전문가 및 연구자,  학생, 기타 시민사회단체 활동가 등등

4. 기간

2020년 1-2월, 한 달 동안 진행

5. 참여방법

아래 구글 설문조사 링크에 접속하시어, 총 12개 객관식 문항 응답

구글 설문조사 링크 ☞ https://forms.gle/FXn1UTLcc6L1p9Vn9 (클릭)

█  아울러 1/21(화)에 예정된 관련 토론회에도 많은 참석 부탁드립니다.

토론회 관련 정보: http://bit.ly/2ZcVt1B

문의: 경제정책팀, 국제팀 02-766-5623

RLA 40주년 기념 컨퍼런스

국제시민사회의 코로나 19 위기대응 방안 온라인 강연 씨리즈 4~5월 안내

Right Livelihood Awards (RLA) 재단은 40 주년 기념사업의 일환으로 아래와 같이 온라인 글로벌 컨퍼런스를 개최할 예정입니다. RLA 재단은 미국 UC Santa Cruz의 Right Livelihood College의 주관으로 RLA 역대 수상자(OB)들과 신규 수상자(YB)들과 함께 “코로나19 등 우리사회에 가장 시급한 현안”들을 공유하고 향후 위기대응 방안을 논의하고자 합니다.

※ 시청방법: Zoom 또는 YouTube 채널 접속:

☞ https://rightlivelihood.ucsc.edu/events/webinars.html (라이브 시청 공지)

☞ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCoANHFe83hG20ZukmjTvEtw (YouTube 라이브 채널 바로가기)

☞ https://www.youtube.com/RightLivelihoodFoundation (지난 강연 다시보기)

경실련은 지난 2003년 국내에서는 유일하게 RLA 대안노벨상을 수상하였습니다. 경실련은 RLA의 OB단체로서 이번 RLA 40주년 기념 컨퍼런스에 함께 연대하고 있습니다. 여러분들의 많은 관심과 시청 부탁드립니다.

<5월 연사 일정>

5월 6일 (아시아 지역, 오후 8시 ~ 9시 15분): 코로나 시대의 물의 정의와 극복과제

– 연사자 1. 마우드 발로 (RLA 2005년 수상자)

– 연사자 2. 로버트 빌로트 (RLA 2017년 수상자)

5월 13일 (아시아, 오후 8시 ~ 9시 15분): 민주주의의 위기와 기회

– 연사자 1. 프랜시스 모어-라페 (RLA 1987년 수상자)

– 연사자 2. 베스나 테실릭 (RLA 1998년 수상자)

– 연사자 3. 자밀라 라큅 (앨버트 아인슈타인 연구소, RLA 2012년 수상단체)

5월 27일 (아시아, 오후 8시 ~ 9시 15분): 위기속 불평등과 취약점

– 연사자 1. 글로렌 다스 (Tenaganita, RLA 2005년 수상단체)

– 연사자 2. 만프레드 노박 (Global Campus for Human Rights)

지난 4월 강연 영상 등 관련 행사 정보는 아래 내용 또는 링크를 직접 참조하시길 바랍니다.

Inspiring Change in Times of Crisis –  Conversations that Matter Series

Our common global challenges are becoming increasingly acute and tangible all over the globe; for example the climate crisis, authoritarian governance, the continuous threat of violent conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons, and growing inequality between rich and poor.  We are now facing a new global crisis, as the spread of COVID-19 is affecting everyone around the world. As part of the Right Livelihood Foundation 40th Anniversary, three global conferences were planned for the spring of 2020. Two of them are currently postponed, due to the pandemic. The Foundation has therefore adapted with new ideas and will instead launch an online series, inviting Laureates under different themes. These conversations will be spread in the Foundation’s network and Right Livelihood College network.

May 6: Water Justice in the Age of Coronavirus and Beyond

Water contaminated by toxic chemical wastes; hundreds of millions without access to minimum necessary quantities of potable water.  These were grave, immense issues long before the coronavirus pandemic.  Now the pandemic, raging globally, poses new questions for us:  Do these pre-existing conditions, the polluted waters, the lack of access, make the pandemic worse?  Conversely, will the pandemic affect society’s future ability or willingness to improve access and quality?  These are the kinds of questions we will be exploring in this webinar with two Right Livelihood laureates, Maude Barlow and Robert Bilott.

Speakers:

• Maude Barlow (2005 Laureate)
• Robert Bilott (2017 Laureate)

Wednesday, May 6th, 8:00-9:15 AM Pacific (5:00-6:15 PM CET)
Click here for timezone conversion. Click here to add to your calendar.

Right Livelihood Laureates

Maude Barlow was given the Right Livelihood Award in 2005 “...for her exemplary and longstanding worldwide work for trade justice and the recognition of the fundamental human right to water.” Maude is the National Chairperson of the Council of Canadians and chairs Food & Water Watch’s board. She is also an executive member of the San Francisco-based International Forum on Globalization and a Councillor with the Hamburg-based World Future Council. Maude is the recipient of 14 honorary doctorates. She is the recipient of many awards, in addition to the Right Livelihood Award, including the Citation of Lifetime Achievement at the 2008 Canadian Environment Awards, and the 2009 Earth Day Canada Outstanding Environmental Achievement Award. In 2008/2009, she served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United Nations General Assembly. She is also the best-selling author or co-author of 19 books, including Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and The Coming Battle for the Right to Water, and most recently Whose Water is it Anyway? Taking Water Protection into Public Hands.

Robert Bilott was given the Right Livelihood Award in 2017 “…for exposing a decades-long history of chemical pollution, winning long-sought justice for the victims, and setting a precedent for effective regulation of hazardous substances.” Rob is a partner at the law firm of Taft Settinius & Hollister LLP in Cincinnati, Ohio. For more than 29 years, Rob has handled a wide variety of highly complex environmental matters and related toxic tort litigation for a diverse array of clients, including the nation’s first cases involving PFAS drinking water contamination. To date, Rob has secured benefits in excess of $1 Billion for clients impacted by PFAS contamination, including through key leadership positions in the nation’s first class action, personal injury, medical monitoring, and multi-district litigations and trials. In a legal battle lasting 19 years, he represented 70,000 citizens whose drinking water had been contaminated with Perfluorooctanic acid (PFOA) by the chemical giant DuPont. Expanding upon the concept of class-action litigation, he set up a 7-year toxicological study of the 70,000 victims, which contributed significantly to the scientific understanding of the global health risks associated with the entire class of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS). This class of substances, which do not break down in the environment or the human body, are ubiquitous in our societies today. At a time when environmental regulation is under serious threat of being watered down in the United States and elsewhere, Bilott successfully won compensation for his clients and continues to call for better regulation of toxic substances. Rob is the author of the book, “Exposure: Poisoned Water, Corporate Greed, and One Lawyer’s Twenty-Year Battle against DuPont,” and his story is the inspiration for the new motion picture, “Dark Waters”, starring Mark Ruffalo as Rob. His story is also featured in the documentary available on Netflix, “The Devil We Know.”  Rob is a frequent lecturer and speaker on environmental issues internationally, including presentations to the EU and UK parliaments and UN organizations.

Moderator

Andrew Szasz received his BA from Harvard College (1969), his MA from the University of Chicago (1971), and his Ph.D., in Sociology, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison (1982). He has taught at the University of California, Santa Cruz since 1986, first as Professor of Sociology, later as Professor of Environmental Studies. Szasz taught courses on Social Theory, Environmental Sociology, Environmental Justice, the American Environmental Movement, and the Sociology of Climate Change. He has written books and articles on environmental regulation, grassroots toxics movements, green consuming, environmental justice, and, most recently, on the sociology of climate change. His books include EcoPopulism:  Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice and Shopping Our Way to Safety:  How We Changed from Protecting the Environment to Protecting Ourselves. Most recently, Szasz co-edited How the World’s Religions are Responding to Climate Change: Social Scientific Investigations.

May 13: Threats & Opportunities to Democracy

As the Coronavirus spreads around the world, it is having far-reaching effects not only on public health, but also on our capacities for democratic politics. States have responded to the pandemic in various ways as they try to quickly implement new rules and restrictions for their populations to fight COVID-19. Many of these measures have not followed regular democratic protocols for decision-making, and some raise serious concerns about threats to democracy posed by increasing authoritarianism, lack of transparency, repression of media and opposition groups and parties, and other concerns. At the same time, crises can also be moments of political opportunity. As countries grapple with the Coronavirus, there is a spotlight on issues of unemployment, labour conditions, access to health care, and social interdependence, and this may provide openings and momentum for new democratic movements and agendas. What are the threats to democracy we should be grappling with and trying to prevent? What opportunities and potentials do we see for future democratic societies that we could be building now?

Speakers:

• Frances More-Lappé (1987 Laureate)
• Vesna Tercelic (1998 Laureate)
• Jamila Raqib, Executive Director of the Albert Einstein Institute founded by Gene Sharp (2012 Laureate)

Wednesday, May 13, 2020 – 8:00-9:00 AM Pacific
Threats & Opportunities for Democracy

With Frances Moore-Lappé (USA), Jamila Raqib (USA), Vesna Teršelič (Croatia) & Elizabeth Beaumont (USA, Moderator)

As the Coronavirus spreads around the world, it is having far-reaching effects not only on public health, but also on our capacities for democratic politics. States have responded to the pandemic in various ways as they try to quickly implement new rules and restrictions for their populations to fight COVID-19. Many of these measures have not followed regular democratic protocols for decision-making, and some raise serious concerns about threats to democracy posed by increasing authoritarianism, lack of transparency, repression of media and opposition groups and parties, and other concerns. At the same time, crises can also be moments of political opportunity.  As countries grapple with the Coronavirus, there is a spotlight on issues of unemployment, labor conditions, access to health care, and social interdependence, and this may provide openings and momentum for new democratic movements and agendas.   What are the threats to democracy we should be grappling with and trying to prevent?  What opportunities and potentials do we see for future democratic societies that we could be building now?

May 27: Inequality and Vulnerability in Crisis

Around the world, states and organisations are struggling to control the outbreak of COVID-19. The directives from WHO declares that we should constantly wash our hands, keep good hygiene, and stay inside to protect others. But how does this affect the part of the population without access to basic hygiene articles, running water or a home to take refuge in when quarantine rules are applied. Like most crises, COVID-19 takes extraordinarily high demands on those already exposed in society. How can we turn this crisis into an opportunity to strengthen human rights and more just societies?

Speakers:

• Glorene Das from Tenaganita (2005 Laureate)
• Manfred Nowak, Global Campus for Human Rights

Past conversations in the series:

April 17, Building Solidarity Economics in the Age of Coronavirus and Beyond

Join us for a timely panel discussion on how Nnimmo and Vandana’s alternative economic frameworks are informing and informed by this moment of the coronavirus crisis. We will consider how these frameworks can inform all of us about positive paths forward, and how we might turn this moment of great tragedy and challenge into a future of opportunities.

Speakers:

• Nnimmo Bassey (2010 Laureate)
• Vandana Shiva (1993 Laureate)

위 행사 관련정보: https://www.rightlivelihoodaward.org/40th-anniversary-conferences/ 또는 https://rightlivelihood.ucsc.edu/events/webinars.html 에 접속하시면 직접 확인하실 수 있습니다.

문의: 국제팀 (02-766-5623)

RLA 40주년기념, 한-일 도쿄 심포지엄 개최

2/20(토) 오전10시, Zoom 화상회의

스웨덴 소재 RLA(The Right Livelihood Award, 바른생활상) 대안노벨상 재단은 40주년을 맞아 수상단체인 경실련과 일본 원자력정보실, 다카기 진자부로 시민과학기금, 생활클럽연합회 등과 함께 심포지엄을 이번주 2월 20일(토) 오전 10시부터 화상회의를 통해 온라인 송출, 개최합니다.

이번 RLA 40주년기념 한-일 도쿄 심포지엄는 OB와 YB 수상자들간 교류를 통해 경실련 30년 시민운동의 노하우를 전수하고자 마련됐습니다. 또한 한국과 마찬가지로, 일본 내 후쿠시마 원전사고 이후 재가동 중단과 재처리 현황을 살펴보고, 나아가 한-일 시민사회가 지향해야할 지속가능한 미래 에너지 정책과 변화에 대해 살펴보고자 합니다.

<기념행사 개요>

○ 일시: 2021년 2월 20일(토) 오전 10시~16시 30분

○ 접속: 온라인 Zoom 화상회의
– URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82040132989?pwd=NHNKN3ZwanNoa1BmQW5Tc2RUM3dhUT09 (9:45분부터 입장가능)
– ID: 820 4013 2989 / PW: 627721

○ 프로그램

○ 주최: RLA 40주년 기념행사 실행위원회(원자력정보실, 다카기 진자부로 시민과학기금, 생활클럽연합회)

* 본 행사는, 누구나 참석하실 수 있습니다. 회원님 등의 많은 참여 부탁드립니다.

1. 개최 보도자료
2. 웹자보 (일본어)
3. 프로그램 (한국어)

문의: 국제팀 02-766-5623

BigTech 기업의 글로벌 디지털협력 거버넌스 지배에 반대한다

UN 디지털다자협력 거버넌스 BigTech 기업 구성에 대한 국제시민사회 입장

경실련과 Just Net Coalition 등 전세계 172개 시민단체들은 UN 디지털다자협력 거버넌스에 거대기술(BigTech) 기업들이 이해관계자로서 참여하는 인터넷 거버넌스 포럼(IGF) 구성안에 대해 반대하는 입장의 탄원서를 안토니우 구테흐스 UN사무총장 앞으로 제출하였다.

UN사무총장의 주도로 발족된 ‘디지털 상호의존시대(UN, 2019)에 대비하기 위한 UN 디지털다자협력’ 이니셔티브는, 향후 “디지털 공공정책과 관련된 규범”을 조율하기 위한 논의의 장을 만들기 위해 기획된 것이었다. 이를 위해, 우리 경실련은 작년 UN 디지털다자협력에 필요한 경제, 사회정책과 거버넌스 구성안에 대한 공정회를 개최하여 결과 보고서와 권고안을 UN사무총장 앞으로 제출하기도 했다(https://bit.ly/2wjnL0l).

그러나, 올해 UN사무총장이 글로벌 디지털협력 로드맵을 발표하면서, 돌연 BigTech기업들까지도 포함시킴으로써 애초 예정했던 정책기구의 목적과 거버넌스를 흐릴 우려가 있다. 특히, BigTech기업이 참여하게 될 경우 IGF는 컨소시업 투자 형태의 민관협력의 장으로 변질될 수밖에 없고, 그 결과 저개발국이나 개도국 등에 “헤지펀드와 차관이 결합된 유상원조(ODA+PPP)”를 빌미로 BigTech의 시장지배력이 더욱 확대되어 “금권정치”의 장으로 변질될 우려가 크다.

이러한 우려에 따라 우리 국제시민사회는 다음과 같이 BigTech 기업의 글로벌 디지털협력 거버넌스에 참여하는 것에 반대하는 입장을 전달하며, BigTech 기업의 참여를 제한할 것을 촉구한다.

More than 170 Civil Society Groups Worldwide Oppose Plans for a Big Tech Dominated Body for Global Digital Governance

Not only in developing countries but also in the US and EU, calls for stronger regulation of Big Tech are rising. At the precise point when we should be shaping global norms to regulate Big Tech, plans have emerged for an ‘empowered’ global digital governance body that will evidently be dominated by Big Tech. Adding vastly to its already overweening power, this new Body would help Big Tech resist effective regulation, globally and at national levels. Indeed, we face the unbelievable prospect of ‘a Big Tech led body for Global Governance of Big Tech.’

To Antonio Guterres
The Secretary General,
United Nations, New York

Your ‘Roadmap for Digital Cooperation’ rightly recognizes that “the world is at a critical inflection point for technology governance, made more urgent by the ongoing pandemic”. We are however concerned that the proposal for a new “strategic and empowered” High-Level Multistakeholder Body with substantial digital policies related roles runs directly counter to the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and its official follow up process. It is in any case unacceptable that such an apex policy body will have corporations and government nominees sitting as equals. Worse, the proposed Body will rely largely on private (i.e., corporate) funding, and the main proposal currently on the table for this Body suggests linking gaining a seat on it with providing funding support. This is a new low for the UN and an unthinkably dangerous direction for the future of global governance.

The WSIS mandated a process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ for developing “international public policies pertaining to the Internet” (or global digital policies), and a multistakeholder policy dialogue space, the Internet Governance Forum. While a multistakeholder UN Internet Governance Forum has been functioning since 2006, the multilateral element of actual policy development, the ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ framework, is yet to come to fruition. However, it remains firmly on the agenda of WSIS follow-up, with the UN General Assembly in December 2020, noting “the need for continued dialogue and work on the implementation of enhanced cooperation” as envisioned by the WSIS.

The delay in setting up a governments led UN body/mechanism/framework for digital policies, as mandated by the WSIS, leaves a temporary vacuum into which this proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body seeks to insinuate itself. Yet the mandate is not at all clear for how the official, formal, process for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ can be superseded (and subverted) by an informal process led by the Secretary General’s office (albeit with a slightly changed name of ‘Digital Cooperation’). (See Annex 1 to this document on how this expressly violates mandates from the WSIS and UN GA).

With the IGF working well as a policy dialogue forum, the various functions laid out for the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body─although often stated in rather roundabout ways─seem designed to make it ‘the’ prime norms setting body for global digital governance, while providing it a private funding base. (See Annex 2 on the obvious policy role of this proposed Body and its problematic funding model.)

Not just in developing countries but also in the US and EU, calls for stronger regulation of Big Tech are rising. At the precise point when we should be shaping global norms to regulate Big Tech, it is a sheer paradox to see plans emerge for an ‘empowered’ global digital governance body that will clearly be dominated by Big Tech. Adding vastly to its already overweening power, this new Body would help Big Tech resist effective regulation, globally and at national levels. We indeed face the unbelievable prospect of ‘a Big Tech led body for Global Governance of Big Tech’.

A Readers Guide (University of Massachusetts-Boston) describes how the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Redesign Initiative believed that “‘multistakeholder consultations’ on global matters should evolve into ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ arrangements.” “This transformation means that non-state actors would no longer just provide input to decision-makers … but would actually be responsible for making global policy decisions.” The Global Redesign Initiative’sreport sought a focus first on “designing multistakeholder structures for the institutions that deal with global problems with an online dimension.” And then: “…as ever more problems come to acquire an online dimension, the multistakeholder institution would become the default in international cooperation.”

The sense of déjà vuin what is now unfolding in front of us is rather eerie. The first step of turning a body for ‘multistakeholder consultations’ (IGF) into one for ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ (the IGF plus, High-Level Multistakeholder Body) for the ‘online’ or digital’ dimension, is evidently underway. To be noted also is how the term ‘cooperation’ is deployed in the above WEF ‘plan’ to mean actual policymaking, similar to its use in the ‘Digital Cooperation’ initiative and architecture.

We urge the office of the UN Secretary-General to immediately withdraw the proposal for a High-level Multistakeholder Body for ‘Digital Cooperation,’ since it would become the de facto body for ‘global digital governance.’ If this proposal is adopted, it will sound the death knell of democratic and multilateral global governance, replacing it with corporate-led governance systems, that (as envisaged by the WEF) will extend more widely with the increasing digitalization of all sectors.

Indeed, such capture of policy forums is already happening across several dimensions of the UN multilateral system. It already exerts a direct impact on people’s lives─as we see now clearly in the pandemic in the case of governance of health, but also in the governance of food, education, and environment. Recent developments such as COVAX and Food Systems Summit are examples of movement in this direction, following the model further advanced in the WEF’s latest ‘The Great Re-Set’. The rapidly growing role of big data, AI, and digital platforms in all sectors fits well with the move towards, in effect, global self-regulation of Big Tech, and would have the effect of a further lock-in of this approach across all sectors.

As it has been mandated by the WSIS, we further urge the office of the UN Secretary-General to dedicate itself to exploring how best a democratic system for global digital governance can be developed, following the WSIS guidelines.

Our specific requests from the office of the Secretary-General:

1. The proposal for an ‘empowered and strategic’ High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation should be shelved. We do not see any role or need for it;

2. A clear distinction should be made between what could be Digital Cooperation for assisting UN agencies in deploying digital technologies in programmatic terms, on the one hand, and UN’s core digital policy functions, on the other. With regard to the former, some steps have been proposed in the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. We may have varying levels of concerns in relation to some of these steps. However, what we are most concerned about here is the completely unacceptable over-reach of the Digital Cooperation agenda towards substantive policy functions, even if somewhat hidden under various vague terms and descriptions. The Digital Cooperation agenda should be re-worked to be confined, if at all, to programmatic and policy dialogue functions. Any framework or forum set up under it should not in the slightest exceed such functions. This should be fully clarified in all relevant documents and mandates. All the vague and confusing language in this regard should be replaced with a clear description of roles and functions, fully excluding any substantive policy roles. We are happy to offer our further suggestions and assistance in this regard;

3. Efforts should be renewed in full earnest to develop a genuinely democratic system for global digital governance, keeping vested corporate interests at bay. The office of the Secretary-General should start a new, formal, process of consultation on this issue as per WSIS guidelines. This is especially pertinent now given the dramatically changed public and political opinion on the need for close regulation of Big Tech, and the fact that Big Tech is global and therefore requires a certain level of effective global governance, with appropriate global norms and policies.

Signed

Global

1. Just Net Coalition (Global)
2. Transnational Institute (TNI) (Global)
3. Society for International Development (SID) (Global)
4. Tricontinental Centre (CETRI) (Belgium)
5. FIAN International (Global)
6. Focus on the Global South (Asia)
7. ETC Group (Global)
8. Global Campaign for Education (Global)
9. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) (Global)
10. Internet Ciudadana (Latin America)
11. Association for Proper Internet Governance (Switzerland)
12. Agencia Latinoamericana de Información (ALAI) (Latin America)
13. Nexus Research Cooperative (Ireland)
14. Social Watch (Global)
15. Observatory of Linguistic and Cultural Diversity on the Internet (Global)
16. IT for Change (India)
17. Third World Network
18. Bread for the World
19. Agencia internacional de noticias PRESSENZA
20. Public Health Movement
21. LDC Watch
22. Global Forest Coalition
23. World Association for Christian Communication (WACC)
24. Baby Milk Action, International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN)
25. Badayl
26. DisCO.coop
27. Emergent Works
28. Evolution of Mind, Life and Society Research Institute (EMLS RI)
29. Friends of The Earth International
30. International Movement of Catholic Agricultural Rural Youth (MIJARC)
31. Oikotree Global Forum
32. People’s Dialogue
33. Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity (RIPESS)
34. Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)
35. The Corner House
36. Urgenci Internatonal Network
37. Women Engage for a Common Future (WECF)
38. Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID)
39. World March of Women International
40. Both ENDS
41. Ethical Minds

Regional

42. European Coordination Via Campesina (ECVC) (Europe)
43. Alianza Biodiversidad (Latin America)
44. Foro de Comunicación para la Integración de NuestrAmérica (Latin America)
45. Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación (CLADE) (Latin America)
46. Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación y Comunicación Popular (ALER) (Latin America)
47. ALBA TV (Latin America)
48. Jubileo Sur/Américas (Latin America)
49. Sursiendo, Comunicación y Cultura Digital (Latin America)
50. Fundación de Estudios, Acción y Participación Social (FEDAEPS) (Latin America)
51. Colectivo Voces Ecológicas (COVEC) -Radio Temblor internacional (Latin America)
52. Consejo de Educación Popular de América Latina y el Caribe (CEAAL) (Latin America)
53. Project on Organising, Development, Education and Research (PODER) (Latin America)
54. Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E) (Europe)
55. Platform of Filipino Migrant Organisations (Europe)
56. Europe External Programme with Africa (Africa)
57. France Amérique Latine (FAL) (Latin America)
58. Africa Europa Faith and Justice Network (Europe, Africa)
59. African Centre for Biodiversity (Africa)
60. ALTSEAN-Burma (Southeast Asia)
61. Africaine de Recherche et de Coopération pour l’Appui au Développement Endogène (ARCADE) (Africa)
62. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants (Asia Pacific)
63. Associació Cultural i Medi Ambiental Arrels (País Valencia, Països Catalans –SPAIN)
64. BlueLink Foundation (Europe)
65. Des De Baix –Attac PV (Baix Vinalopó, Spain)
66. Manushya Foundation (Southeast Asia)
67. International Institute for Non Violent Action (NOVACT) (Mediterranean)
68. Rural Women’s Assembly (Africa)
69. Sisters of Charity Federation (United States)
70. Tax Justice Network Africa (Africa)
71. Women In Development Europe+ (WIDE+) (Europe)
72. WoMin African Alliance (Africa)
73. Torang Trust (Asia)
74. Empower India (Asia Pacific)
75. Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos “Segundo Montes Mozo S.J.” (CSMM) (Latin America)
76. Pesticide Action Network North America (PANNA) (North America)
77. Public Service International (PSI Américas)(Latin America)
78. Transform Europe (Europe)

National

79. Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign -Stop the Wall (Palestine)
80. National Fisheries Solidarity Movement (Sri Lanka)
81. Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) (Colombia)
82. Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) (Germany)
83. Coordinacion De Ong Y Cooperativas (CONGCOOP) (Guatemala)
84. Deca, Equipo Pueblo, AC (Mexico)
85. Human Rights and Business Centre (HOMA) (Brazil)
86. Zambia Alliance for Agroecology and Biodiversity (ZAAB) (Zambia)
87. Afrikagrupperna (Sweden)
88. Participatory Research Action Network (PRAN) (Bangladesh)
89. Food Security Network (KHANI) (Bangladesh)
90. Centro de Estudios Humanistas de Córdoba (Argentina)
91. Agrupacion 19 de Octubre SUTEL (Uruguay)
92. Red en Defensa de la Humanidad (Ecuador)
93. Ateneo La Vaquita (Argentina)
94. Observatorio Latinoamericano de Geopolítica (OLAG) –UNAM (México)
95. Tatuy TV (Venezuela)
96. DIGNIDAD Movement (Phillipines)
97. Fundación Vía Libre (Argentina)
98. Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti/ Anti-Jindal & Anti-POSCO Movement (PPSS) (India)
99. Phlippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) (Phillipines)
100. SENTRO Nagkakaisa at Progresibong Manggagawa (SENTRO) Trade Union (Philippines)
101. Woman Health (Philippines)
102. Asociación Red de Coordinación en Biodiversidad(Costa Rica)
103. Talent Upgrade Global Concept (Uganda)
104. Acción por la Biodiversidad (Argentina)
105. Aitec France (France)
106. All India IT and ITeS Employees’ Union (India)
107. All India Online Vendors Association (India)
108. Alternative Information Development Centre (SouthAfrica)
109. Association For Promotion Sustainable Development (India)
110. Attac (Austria)
111. Attac (Espana)
112. Aufstehn.at (Austria)
113. Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw (Phillipines)
114. Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio & Communication (BNNRC) (Bangladesh)
115. Botswana Watch Organization (Botswana)
116. Canadian Community Economic Development Network (Canada)
117. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (India)
118. Centro Ecologico (Brazil)
119. Centro Internazionale Crocevia (Italy)
120. Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (South Korea)
121. Comisión Nacional de Enlace (CNE) (Costa Rica)
122. Computer Professionals’ Union (Philippines)
123. Confederation Paysanne (France)
124. Coorg Organisation for Rural Development (India)
125. ECODAWN (India)
126. Emancipate (Indonesia)
127. Ethical Consumer Research Association (United Kingdom)
128. Forum Das ONG/AIDS Do Estado De Sao Paulo (FOAESP) (Brazil)
129. Focsiv Italian Federation Christian NGOs (Italy)
130. Frente Nacional por la Salud de los Pueblos del Ecuador (FNSPE) (Ecuador)
131. Fresh Eyes (United Kingdom)
132. Gender Equity: Citizenship, Work and Family (Mexico)
133. German NGO Forum on Environment and Development (Germany)
134. Gestos (Brazil)
135. Grupo de Incentivo à Vida (GIV) (Brazil)
136. Global Justice Now (United Kingdom)
137. Green Advocates International (Liberia)
138. Grupo de Resistência Asa Branca (GRAB) (Brazil)
139. Grupo de Trabalho sobre Propriedade Intelectual (GTPI) (Brazil)
140. Grupo Semillas (Colombia)
141. Human Rights Online Philippines (HronlinePH) (Phillipines)
142. Indian Social Action Forum (India)
143. Indonesia for Global Justice (Indonesia)
144. Jamaa Resource Initiatives (Kenya)
145. Jatio Sramik Jote (Bangladesh)
146. Justiça Ambiental (JA!) (Mozambique)
147. Kairos Europe WB (Belgium)
148. Knowledge Commune (South Korea)
149. Korea SDGs Network (South Korea)
150. La Asamblea Veracruzana de Iniciativas y Defensa Ambiental (Mexico)
151. LUMEN APS (Italy)
152. National Campaign for Sustainable Development (Nepal)
153. Observatorio de Impactos Sociales de la Inteligencia Artificial (Argentina)
154. Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) (Haïti)
155. REDES-Amigos de la Tierra (FoE) (Uruguay)
156. Research and Support Center for Development Alternatives-Indian Ocean (RSCDA-IO) / Centre de Recherches et d’Appui pour les Alternatives de Développement -Océan Indien (CRAAD-OI) (Madagascar)
157. Rural Infrastructure and Human Resource Development Organization (RIHRDO) (Pakistan)
158. Sciences Citoyennes (France)
159. Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) (Uganda)
160. Sherpa (France)
161. Solifonds (Switzerland)
162. Success Capital Organisation(Botswana)
163. Sunray Harvesters (India)
164. Védegylet Egyesület (Hungary)
165. WomanHealth (Philippines)
166. Zimbabwe Smallholder Organic Farmers Forum (Zimbabwe)
167. Área Genero, Sociedad y Políticas (FLACSO) (Argentina)
168. ATTAC ACORDEM Association of Barcelona (Spain)
169. Urgewald, (Germany)
170. Vigencia (Brazil)
171. TWN, Trust (India)
172. Volkshilfe Österrei (Austria)

Annex 1

Abrief institutional history of WSIS and its follow up in relation to the proposal for a High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, mandated two complementary but distinct policy processes; a multilateral process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ for actual policymaking, and a multistakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as a policy dialogue forum.

UN IGF was formed in 2006, and it meets annually. In 2010, the UN General Assembly (GA) set up a Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) Working Group on Improvements to the IGF. Its report was adopted by the UN GA and has been implemented. Significantly, many design elements of the now proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body─involving new kinds of more substantive policy roles for the IGF or IGF associated bodies─were expressly considered by this Working Group and rejected. It is concerning, and unacceptable, how these elements of an ‘empowered IGF plus’, having been rejected by a formal process pursuant to extensive consultations, are re-emerging through the back-door of an informal process driven by the Secretary General’s office.

The other WSIS-mandated ‘complementary’ process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’, for actual policymaking, remained a contested issue. From 2014 to 2018, two successive CSTD Working Groups considered various ways to implement this key WSIS recommendation, but an agreement could not be reached. However, this process of exploring the appropriate architecture for Enhanced Cooperation on global digital policies is not closed. The WSIS+10 meeting in 2015 called for “continued dialogue and work on the implementation of enhanced cooperation.” This call was repeated by a UN GA resolution in 2020.

As with the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the IGF─and quite likely an extension of it─the new High-Level Multistakeholder Body would have corporation and government nominees, in addition to some technical community and civil society members, sit as equals. This is acceptable for the MAG whose role is basically to develop the program for the annual IGF. On the other hand, the proposed new High-Level Multistakeholder Body has a clear and central policy role. There is no evident reason otherwise to go beyond the current IGF and MAG structure, which has been performing well as a policy dialogue system, as mandated by the WSIS.

The current proposal appears to be a clear effort to creep from the IGF side to the Enhanced Cooperation side of the WSIS mandate, because it was the Enhanced Cooperation process, which was supposed to undertake the policy development role. It is precisely to pre-empt any such mission creep from the ‘policy dialogue’ multistakeholder IGF side to substantive policy space that the UN GA has clearly stated in its post WSIS resolutions that the IGF and Enhanced Cooperation are to be ‘distinct’ i.e. separate processes. There is, therefore, no scope for an ‘Internet Governance Forum plus model’ or to ‘enhance the Forum’ (both terms from the SG’s Roadmap document), as some kind of a hybrid between the policy dialogue function of the IGF and substantive policy function of the WSIS mandated ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ (which is supposed to be multilateral, but with multistakeholder consultations). The new High-Level Multistakeholder Body is evidently trying to become such a hybrid. This is a clear subversion of the architecture laid out by the WSIS and subsequent guidelines from the UN GA.

The High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation is evidently ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ in camouflage, seeking to take over the latter’s digital policy development role. Only that it does not at all qualify for such a role from a WSIS mandate point of view, which laid out directions of what and how of such an Internet/digital policy body in its Tunis Agenda.

Once such a High-Level Multistakeholder Body dabbling in substantive policy issues is formed, it will slowly but surely seek to fill up the vacuum left by the non-creation of a democratic and multi-lateral body for the development of global Internet and digital policies. It will thus come to be at the apex of global digital governance and policy system.

Annex 2

Some quotes from documents related to the High-Level Multistakeholder Body, which show its proposed central policy role and problematic private funding model

The evident central policy function of the proposed High Level Multistakeholder Body

The report of the ‘High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation’, on which the UN Secretary General’s (SG) ‘Roadmap for Digital Cooperation’ is based, described the policy function of the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body in this fashion:

…incubate policies and norms for public discussion and adoption. In response to requests to look at a perceived regulatory gap, it would examine if existing norms and regulations could fill the gap and, if not, form a policy group consisting of interested stakeholders to make proposals to governments and other decision-making bodies. It would monitor policies and norms through feedback from the bodies that adopt and implement them.

Building on this report, the SG’s Roadmap specifically calls for:

Creating a strategic and empowered multi-stakeholder high-level body, building on the experience of the existing multi-stakeholder advisory group, which would address urgent issues, coordinate follow-up action on Forum discussions and relay proposed policy approaches and recommendations from the Forum to the appropriate normative and decision-making forum.

The part ‘strategic and empowered’ makes evident that this Body’s role would go much beyond the policy deliberation function of the UN IGF. It will have some strategic, policy-related power. ‘Address urgent issues’ is another part, which points to some kind of decision-making role, quite beyond policy deliberation. So does ‘coordinate follow-up action on IGF discussions’. How does the Body relay ‘policy approaches and recommendations’ from the IGF, when there are no avenues or means for recommendation-making in the IGF? There is obviously meant to be some ‘empowered’ role of choosing, shaping, and incubating policy approaches and recommendations by the new proposed Body.

In default of any other specific Internet or digital norms-shaping or policy-making body in the UN system, policy approaches and recommendations coming out of this proposed Multi-stakeholder High-Level Body will be presented and construed as ‘the’ global norms and soft law in the digital arena.

The private funding model for the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body

In this regard, the report of the ‘High-level Panel’ said:

All stakeholders─including governments, international organizations, businesses, and the tech sector─would be encouraged to contribute.

The SG’s Roadmap builds on this, to propose:

Addressing the long-term sustainability of the Forum and the resources necessary for increased participation, through an innovative and viable fundraising strategy, as promoted by the round table.

No document seems available about what got ‘promoted by the round table’. But all indications are that the focus is on non-UN, private funding. With such an alluring, high-profile digital norms-shaping and policy role, a large part of such funding would very likely come from Big Tech and other corporate sources. A proposal for how the High-Level Multistakeholder Body (HLMB) should be run developed by a Working Group of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the IGF─MAG itself being a strong candidate for a central role in the proposed new Body─has this to say about its funding:

“Probably, some senior people sitting in the MHLB will have a bigger incentive to consider funding the IGF Secretariat, without making this a requirement at all.”

There is more than a hint here of ‘pay to play’. All the relevant documents are generally clear about a focus on private funding, with references to how members of this body being well resourced, and providing various resources for its functions, would be such a good thing.

*Source: https://justnetcoalition.org/big-tech-governing-big-tech.pdf

UN 디지털다자협력 관련 한국시민사회 보고서 및 권고안은 아래 링크를 통해 확인하실 수 있습니다.
*URL: https://bit.ly/2wjnL0l

210307_Petition_More than 170 Civil Society Groups Worldwide Oppose Plans for a Big Tech Dominated Body for Global Digital Governance

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