UN ESCAP 지속개발가능 포럼

“디지털 경제” 동북아 시민사회 권고안

10/20(화) 15:30-19:00 동북아 시민사회 온라인 토론회 결과에 따라, 다음달 11월 3-4일로 예정된 UN ESCAP 지속개발가능 포럼 “코로나19 이후 지속발전 대응 : 디지털 경제” 부문 동북아 시민사회 권고안을 첨부파일과 같이 제출하였습니다.

*[원문]:  Hochul M. Jung. (2020). Korea’s New Forward Challenging Tasks in the Age of Digital Interdependence. Discussion & Recommendation Paper. CSO Session for the NEA SDGs Forum (October 20). CCEJ. The Republic of Korea. (Download)

보다 구체적인 내용은, 아래 링크의 금년 3/2에 유엔본부에 제출했던 UN 디지털 다자협력 보고서의 권고안 원문을 직접 참고하실 수 있습니다.

https://bit.ly/2wjnL0l (Click)

문의:  국제·경제팀 정호철 간사 02-766-5623

OECD/G20 BEPS 포괄적이행체계
디지털세(필라1) 및 최저한세(필라2) 공청회 권고안

상향식 접근법

경제정의실천시민연합, 한국시민사회
2020년 12월 14일

새로운 디지털경제의 상호의존성과 질서에 따라 실질과세를 이행하고 공정과세와 과세투명성의 논의를 촉진시키기 위해, OECD/G20 ‘국가간 소득이전을 통한 세원잠식을 방지하기 위한 조세조약 협약(이하 “BEPS 방지협약”이라고 한다)’은 그 근본 목적에 따라 비록 다국적IT기업의 시장관할 내 고정사업장이나 과세권의 기준이 되는 전자상거래서버가 위치하지 않더라도 소위 ‘네덜란드식 빵 한장 곁들인 아일랜드식 더블 샌드위치(a double Irish with a Dutch sandwich)’와 같이 지적재산권 역외 이송을 통한 과세소득 보호조치가 원인이 되는 공격적 조세회피나 역외탈세를 막기 위해 다국적IT기업들에게 디지털세를 징수하는 것을 근본 목적으로 함에 따라서 이러한 시장관할에 물리적 현존성이 없다는 이유로 그 어떤 다른 국다들의 과세권을 배제할 수 없는 것과 마찬가지로 이러한 시장지위를 갖는 다국적IT기업 역시 원천지국과세의 대상에서 다음의 ‘상향식’ 접근법에 따라 배제할 수 없다:

(1) 기본적으로, 과세소득은 원격시장을 포함한 국내원천시장에서 인터넷을 통해 소비자뿐만 아니라 기업에게도 국경을 넘는 다국적IT기업의 전자적 용역 거래가 원인이 되는 것으로 디지털세의 광범위한차별적용 (*즉, 디지털 A세액의 B2B/B2C/C2C 적용 구분이 없어야 함, 디지탈 B세액의 소비자대상사업 일괄 삭제) 정치적보복 (*예: 보복관세, 보복세) 경제적차별 (*예를 들면, 과세권 분배기준 총매출 연 7.5억 유로, 한화 약 1조원이상 과세열결점간 이익분배 규모기준 삭제) 기타 예외 (*적용제외 유형자산, 적용유예·면제) 없이 국내 원천지국과세 대상이 된다.

(2) 그럼에도 불구하고, 원친징수세는 각국의 제도에 따라 공제되지 않거나 혹은 다국적IT기업집단의 연결재무제표로 재정통합되기 이전 수입의 조달하거나 그 이후에도 자회사, 계열사, 기타 관계회사를 포함한 거주지국 관할로부터 적절하게 원천귀속의 조정·징수되지 않는 한, 국가적으로 청구, 또는 국제적으로 조정, 또는 잔여”수익”으로 명시된 잔여이익 및 부당하게 외국에서 원천징수된 세후이익 만큼이나 국가별 세수손실에 따라 초국적으로 과세가능한 통상적인 이익 배분의 대상이 될 수 있다.

(3) 그럼에도 불구하고, 잔여수익과 통상이익은 증거에 따라 배분되지 않거나 혹은 각 원천지국으로부터 비례적으로 조정·수정되지 않는 한, 조세관할간 분쟁조정과 논의의 이익(즉, 과세 확실성)을 따지기 위해, 예컨대 다국적IT기업의 총수입, 판매비, 순이익에 따라 판단될 수 있다. 이는 본래 관계회사 간에 무형자산 (*예를 들면, 영업권, 브랜드인지도, 외 특허권, 상표권, 저작권을 포함하는 지적재산권 이송)을 과도하게 감가상각 하여 이전가격을 과도하게 부풀려 정상가격의 원칙에 위배되는 과소공제 비용으로부터 기초하여, 중간모회사가 자회사 관할구역으로부터 분할된 무형자산의 원천귀속과 지적재산권의 이송을 통해 비정상적인 연결과세소득을 올림으로써, 궁극적인 지배회사인 모회사관할 구역 내 순부당이익, 계열사간 불공정영업이익, 그리고 미국 글로벌 무형자산 종합과세 (2019), 일명 “징벌세”로 10.5%의 최저고정세율에 따른 세전과소 내지 비과세 수익 만큼이나, 정작 OECD/G20 BEP S방지세의 목적이 되는 평균 실효세율이 20%전/후인 점을 감안하면, 결국  (a) 정상가격에 반하는 이전가격에 대해서는 비용공제부인 규칙 최우선 적용,  그리고 (b)최저한세 20% 수준 소득산입 규칙 적용, 비로소  (c)각국의 과세수익에 따라 통상·잔여 초과이익 이익분배가 이루어질 수 있다.

Recommendations to OECD / G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS:

Bottom-Up Approach

Hochul M. Jung, Hyochang Pang & Hun Park
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Korean Civil Society
December 14, 2020

In a new order to facilitate fair and transparent taxation and fulfill actual taxation in line with the digital economic interdependence, the OECD/G20’s Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“Anti-BEPS Tax Treaty”), which has the fundamental purpose of imposing digital tax on information technology-based multinational enterprises (“IT-MNEs”) against their offshore tax evasion or their aggressive tax avoidance that results from offshore ring-fence through intellectual property (“IP”) immigration like a double Irish with a Dutch sandwich although neither a permanent establishment nor an electronic commerce server places within the market they’ve affected, cannot be allowed to rule out any other source countries from taxing rights by reason of non-physical presence in this market jurisdiction as well as cannot be allowed to rule out such an IT-MNE on the market presence from subject to tax, as the following bottom-up approaches:  basically, (1) Taxable Income that results from cross-border transactions of the ELECTRONIC SERVCIES IT-MNEs provided for not only customers but also businesses over the Internet on the domestic source market including remote marketing is subject to domestic withholding tax WITHOUT broad scope differentiation (viz. Amount A: among B2B/B2C/C2C, i.e., all-inclusive; Amount B: consumer-facing business, all-eliminated) nor political retaliation (e.g., retaliatory tariffs or taxes, or harmful tax competition, etc.) or economic discrimination (for example, profit allocation by income above an “EUR 750 million” annual gross revenue threshold) or any exceptions (for example, safe harbors or crave-outs);  nonetheless, (2) the Withholding Tax, unless deducted at the source regime from each country nor applicably adjusted or collected at sourcing of revenue from their resident jurisdictions including subsidiary, affiliate, related entities, before or after financially consolidated by the IT-MNE group, can be nationally claimed, or internationally co-ordinated, or so transnationally taxable as to be subject to routine profit allocation by each country’s income tax revenue loss as much as their own ill-taxed income and residual profit under the name of residual “income”;  notwithstanding, (3) not only the Residual Profit but the Routine Profit, unless evidently allocated nor proportionally co-ordinated or corrected from each source, for the sake of argument among these tax jurisdictions in dispute, may be judged upon the IT-MNE group’s total revenue, cost of sales and net income, which originally results from their transfer mispricing by overcostly amortizing their intangible assets (for example, goodwill, brand recognition and IP immigration including patents, trademarks, copyrights) and undertaxed payments against the arm’s length principle, whereby their intermediate parent jurisdictions gains abnormal profit by revenue sourcing, sourcing of intangibles from the other jurisdictions and thereby the ultimate parent jurisdiction hides such a transnationally taxable income as much as their own unjust gain, unfair profit, untaxed or undertaxed income ― now, now in the name of U.S. IRS’s Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (2019), officially [sic] “GUILTY” ― into their tax havens too far below the “20% (Laffitte et al., 2020; Bach et al, 2019; etc.)” threshold that fall under the Anit-BEPS tax target at a more or less OECD/G20’s corporate effective average tax rate (“EATR”), and eventually, (a) undertaxed payments against transfer mispricing, (b) income inculsion up to the 20% minimum tax rate, and (c) rutine & residual profits allocation by sharing each country’s taxable income proptionalty be formulated.

[*] This statement was contributed by our true activist, Hochul Jung ([email protected]) and our peer reviewers, Prof. Hyochang Pang ([email protected]) and Prof. Hoon Park ([email protected]) in a new order to propose an alternative approach to OECD ([email protected])

You can refer to our CCEJ. (2019a). Review of the OECD’s proposed “Unified Approach” under Pillar One. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2DiPRZs; CCEJ. (2019b). Against the OECD’s proposed “Global Anti-Base Erosion” under Pillar Two. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/3m9tYAo

If you need more information about us.

■ Please, visit us: http://ccej.or.kr/eng/who-we-are/about-us/;
■ Refer to our Achievements (RLA, 2003): http://www.rightlivelihoodaward.org/laureates/citizens-coalition-for-economic-justice-ccej/

CCEJ’s Recommendations on BEPS_Bottom-Up Approach

문의: 국제&경제팀 02-3673-2143

RLA 40주년기념, 한-일 도쿄 심포지엄 개최

2/20(토) 오전10시, Zoom 화상회의

스웨덴 소재 RLA(The Right Livelihood Award, 바른생활상) 대안노벨상 재단은 40주년을 맞아 수상단체인 경실련과 일본 원자력정보실, 다카기 진자부로 시민과학기금, 생활클럽연합회 등과 함께 심포지엄을 이번주 2월 20일(토) 오전 10시부터 화상회의를 통해 온라인 송출, 개최합니다.

이번 RLA 40주년기념 한-일 도쿄 심포지엄는 OB와 YB 수상자들간 교류를 통해 경실련 30년 시민운동의 노하우를 전수하고자 마련됐습니다. 또한 한국과 마찬가지로, 일본 내 후쿠시마 원전사고 이후 재가동 중단과 재처리 현황을 살펴보고, 나아가 한-일 시민사회가 지향해야할 지속가능한 미래 에너지 정책과 변화에 대해 살펴보고자 합니다.

<기념행사 개요>

○ 일시: 2021년 2월 20일(토) 오전 10시~16시 30분

○ 접속: 온라인 Zoom 화상회의
– URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82040132989?pwd=NHNKN3ZwanNoa1BmQW5Tc2RUM3dhUT09 (9:45분부터 입장가능)
– ID: 820 4013 2989 / PW: 627721

○ 프로그램

○ 주최: RLA 40주년 기념행사 실행위원회(원자력정보실, 다카기 진자부로 시민과학기금, 생활클럽연합회)

* 본 행사는, 누구나 참석하실 수 있습니다. 회원님 등의 많은 참여 부탁드립니다.

1. 개최 보도자료
2. 웹자보 (일본어)
3. 프로그램 (한국어)

문의: 국제팀 02-766-5623

BigTech 기업의 글로벌 디지털협력 거버넌스 지배에 반대한다

UN 디지털다자협력 거버넌스 BigTech 기업 구성에 대한 국제시민사회 입장

경실련과 Just Net Coalition 등 전세계 172개 시민단체들은 UN 디지털다자협력 거버넌스에 거대기술(BigTech) 기업들이 이해관계자로서 참여하는 인터넷 거버넌스 포럼(IGF) 구성안에 대해 반대하는 입장의 탄원서를 안토니우 구테흐스 UN사무총장 앞으로 제출하였다.

UN사무총장의 주도로 발족된 ‘디지털 상호의존시대(UN, 2019)에 대비하기 위한 UN 디지털다자협력’ 이니셔티브는, 향후 “디지털 공공정책과 관련된 규범”을 조율하기 위한 논의의 장을 만들기 위해 기획된 것이었다. 이를 위해, 우리 경실련은 작년 UN 디지털다자협력에 필요한 경제, 사회정책과 거버넌스 구성안에 대한 공정회를 개최하여 결과 보고서와 권고안을 UN사무총장 앞으로 제출하기도 했다(https://bit.ly/2wjnL0l).

그러나, 올해 UN사무총장이 글로벌 디지털협력 로드맵을 발표하면서, 돌연 BigTech기업들까지도 포함시킴으로써 애초 예정했던 정책기구의 목적과 거버넌스를 흐릴 우려가 있다. 특히, BigTech기업이 참여하게 될 경우 IGF는 컨소시업 투자 형태의 민관협력의 장으로 변질될 수밖에 없고, 그 결과 저개발국이나 개도국 등에 “헤지펀드와 차관이 결합된 유상원조(ODA+PPP)”를 빌미로 BigTech의 시장지배력이 더욱 확대되어 “금권정치”의 장으로 변질될 우려가 크다.

이러한 우려에 따라 우리 국제시민사회는 다음과 같이 BigTech 기업의 글로벌 디지털협력 거버넌스에 참여하는 것에 반대하는 입장을 전달하며, BigTech 기업의 참여를 제한할 것을 촉구한다.

More than 170 Civil Society Groups Worldwide Oppose Plans for a Big Tech Dominated Body for Global Digital Governance

Not only in developing countries but also in the US and EU, calls for stronger regulation of Big Tech are rising. At the precise point when we should be shaping global norms to regulate Big Tech, plans have emerged for an ‘empowered’ global digital governance body that will evidently be dominated by Big Tech. Adding vastly to its already overweening power, this new Body would help Big Tech resist effective regulation, globally and at national levels. Indeed, we face the unbelievable prospect of ‘a Big Tech led body for Global Governance of Big Tech.’

To Antonio Guterres
The Secretary General,
United Nations, New York

Your ‘Roadmap for Digital Cooperation’ rightly recognizes that “the world is at a critical inflection point for technology governance, made more urgent by the ongoing pandemic”. We are however concerned that the proposal for a new “strategic and empowered” High-Level Multistakeholder Body with substantial digital policies related roles runs directly counter to the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and its official follow up process. It is in any case unacceptable that such an apex policy body will have corporations and government nominees sitting as equals. Worse, the proposed Body will rely largely on private (i.e., corporate) funding, and the main proposal currently on the table for this Body suggests linking gaining a seat on it with providing funding support. This is a new low for the UN and an unthinkably dangerous direction for the future of global governance.

The WSIS mandated a process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ for developing “international public policies pertaining to the Internet” (or global digital policies), and a multistakeholder policy dialogue space, the Internet Governance Forum. While a multistakeholder UN Internet Governance Forum has been functioning since 2006, the multilateral element of actual policy development, the ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ framework, is yet to come to fruition. However, it remains firmly on the agenda of WSIS follow-up, with the UN General Assembly in December 2020, noting “the need for continued dialogue and work on the implementation of enhanced cooperation” as envisioned by the WSIS.

The delay in setting up a governments led UN body/mechanism/framework for digital policies, as mandated by the WSIS, leaves a temporary vacuum into which this proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body seeks to insinuate itself. Yet the mandate is not at all clear for how the official, formal, process for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ can be superseded (and subverted) by an informal process led by the Secretary General’s office (albeit with a slightly changed name of ‘Digital Cooperation’). (See Annex 1 to this document on how this expressly violates mandates from the WSIS and UN GA).

With the IGF working well as a policy dialogue forum, the various functions laid out for the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body─although often stated in rather roundabout ways─seem designed to make it ‘the’ prime norms setting body for global digital governance, while providing it a private funding base. (See Annex 2 on the obvious policy role of this proposed Body and its problematic funding model.)

Not just in developing countries but also in the US and EU, calls for stronger regulation of Big Tech are rising. At the precise point when we should be shaping global norms to regulate Big Tech, it is a sheer paradox to see plans emerge for an ‘empowered’ global digital governance body that will clearly be dominated by Big Tech. Adding vastly to its already overweening power, this new Body would help Big Tech resist effective regulation, globally and at national levels. We indeed face the unbelievable prospect of ‘a Big Tech led body for Global Governance of Big Tech’.

A Readers Guide (University of Massachusetts-Boston) describes how the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Redesign Initiative believed that “‘multistakeholder consultations’ on global matters should evolve into ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ arrangements.” “This transformation means that non-state actors would no longer just provide input to decision-makers … but would actually be responsible for making global policy decisions.” The Global Redesign Initiative’sreport sought a focus first on “designing multistakeholder structures for the institutions that deal with global problems with an online dimension.” And then: “…as ever more problems come to acquire an online dimension, the multistakeholder institution would become the default in international cooperation.”

The sense of déjà vuin what is now unfolding in front of us is rather eerie. The first step of turning a body for ‘multistakeholder consultations’ (IGF) into one for ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ (the IGF plus, High-Level Multistakeholder Body) for the ‘online’ or digital’ dimension, is evidently underway. To be noted also is how the term ‘cooperation’ is deployed in the above WEF ‘plan’ to mean actual policymaking, similar to its use in the ‘Digital Cooperation’ initiative and architecture.

We urge the office of the UN Secretary-General to immediately withdraw the proposal for a High-level Multistakeholder Body for ‘Digital Cooperation,’ since it would become the de facto body for ‘global digital governance.’ If this proposal is adopted, it will sound the death knell of democratic and multilateral global governance, replacing it with corporate-led governance systems, that (as envisaged by the WEF) will extend more widely with the increasing digitalization of all sectors.

Indeed, such capture of policy forums is already happening across several dimensions of the UN multilateral system. It already exerts a direct impact on people’s lives─as we see now clearly in the pandemic in the case of governance of health, but also in the governance of food, education, and environment. Recent developments such as COVAX and Food Systems Summit are examples of movement in this direction, following the model further advanced in the WEF’s latest ‘The Great Re-Set’. The rapidly growing role of big data, AI, and digital platforms in all sectors fits well with the move towards, in effect, global self-regulation of Big Tech, and would have the effect of a further lock-in of this approach across all sectors.

As it has been mandated by the WSIS, we further urge the office of the UN Secretary-General to dedicate itself to exploring how best a democratic system for global digital governance can be developed, following the WSIS guidelines.

Our specific requests from the office of the Secretary-General:

1. The proposal for an ‘empowered and strategic’ High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation should be shelved. We do not see any role or need for it;

2. A clear distinction should be made between what could be Digital Cooperation for assisting UN agencies in deploying digital technologies in programmatic terms, on the one hand, and UN’s core digital policy functions, on the other. With regard to the former, some steps have been proposed in the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. We may have varying levels of concerns in relation to some of these steps. However, what we are most concerned about here is the completely unacceptable over-reach of the Digital Cooperation agenda towards substantive policy functions, even if somewhat hidden under various vague terms and descriptions. The Digital Cooperation agenda should be re-worked to be confined, if at all, to programmatic and policy dialogue functions. Any framework or forum set up under it should not in the slightest exceed such functions. This should be fully clarified in all relevant documents and mandates. All the vague and confusing language in this regard should be replaced with a clear description of roles and functions, fully excluding any substantive policy roles. We are happy to offer our further suggestions and assistance in this regard;

3. Efforts should be renewed in full earnest to develop a genuinely democratic system for global digital governance, keeping vested corporate interests at bay. The office of the Secretary-General should start a new, formal, process of consultation on this issue as per WSIS guidelines. This is especially pertinent now given the dramatically changed public and political opinion on the need for close regulation of Big Tech, and the fact that Big Tech is global and therefore requires a certain level of effective global governance, with appropriate global norms and policies.

Signed

Global

1. Just Net Coalition (Global)
2. Transnational Institute (TNI) (Global)
3. Society for International Development (SID) (Global)
4. Tricontinental Centre (CETRI) (Belgium)
5. FIAN International (Global)
6. Focus on the Global South (Asia)
7. ETC Group (Global)
8. Global Campaign for Education (Global)
9. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) (Global)
10. Internet Ciudadana (Latin America)
11. Association for Proper Internet Governance (Switzerland)
12. Agencia Latinoamericana de Información (ALAI) (Latin America)
13. Nexus Research Cooperative (Ireland)
14. Social Watch (Global)
15. Observatory of Linguistic and Cultural Diversity on the Internet (Global)
16. IT for Change (India)
17. Third World Network
18. Bread for the World
19. Agencia internacional de noticias PRESSENZA
20. Public Health Movement
21. LDC Watch
22. Global Forest Coalition
23. World Association for Christian Communication (WACC)
24. Baby Milk Action, International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN)
25. Badayl
26. DisCO.coop
27. Emergent Works
28. Evolution of Mind, Life and Society Research Institute (EMLS RI)
29. Friends of The Earth International
30. International Movement of Catholic Agricultural Rural Youth (MIJARC)
31. Oikotree Global Forum
32. People’s Dialogue
33. Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity (RIPESS)
34. Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)
35. The Corner House
36. Urgenci Internatonal Network
37. Women Engage for a Common Future (WECF)
38. Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID)
39. World March of Women International
40. Both ENDS
41. Ethical Minds

Regional

42. European Coordination Via Campesina (ECVC) (Europe)
43. Alianza Biodiversidad (Latin America)
44. Foro de Comunicación para la Integración de NuestrAmérica (Latin America)
45. Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación (CLADE) (Latin America)
46. Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación y Comunicación Popular (ALER) (Latin America)
47. ALBA TV (Latin America)
48. Jubileo Sur/Américas (Latin America)
49. Sursiendo, Comunicación y Cultura Digital (Latin America)
50. Fundación de Estudios, Acción y Participación Social (FEDAEPS) (Latin America)
51. Colectivo Voces Ecológicas (COVEC) -Radio Temblor internacional (Latin America)
52. Consejo de Educación Popular de América Latina y el Caribe (CEAAL) (Latin America)
53. Project on Organising, Development, Education and Research (PODER) (Latin America)
54. Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E) (Europe)
55. Platform of Filipino Migrant Organisations (Europe)
56. Europe External Programme with Africa (Africa)
57. France Amérique Latine (FAL) (Latin America)
58. Africa Europa Faith and Justice Network (Europe, Africa)
59. African Centre for Biodiversity (Africa)
60. ALTSEAN-Burma (Southeast Asia)
61. Africaine de Recherche et de Coopération pour l’Appui au Développement Endogène (ARCADE) (Africa)
62. Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants (Asia Pacific)
63. Associació Cultural i Medi Ambiental Arrels (País Valencia, Països Catalans –SPAIN)
64. BlueLink Foundation (Europe)
65. Des De Baix –Attac PV (Baix Vinalopó, Spain)
66. Manushya Foundation (Southeast Asia)
67. International Institute for Non Violent Action (NOVACT) (Mediterranean)
68. Rural Women’s Assembly (Africa)
69. Sisters of Charity Federation (United States)
70. Tax Justice Network Africa (Africa)
71. Women In Development Europe+ (WIDE+) (Europe)
72. WoMin African Alliance (Africa)
73. Torang Trust (Asia)
74. Empower India (Asia Pacific)
75. Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos “Segundo Montes Mozo S.J.” (CSMM) (Latin America)
76. Pesticide Action Network North America (PANNA) (North America)
77. Public Service International (PSI Américas)(Latin America)
78. Transform Europe (Europe)

National

79. Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign -Stop the Wall (Palestine)
80. National Fisheries Solidarity Movement (Sri Lanka)
81. Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) (Colombia)
82. Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) (Germany)
83. Coordinacion De Ong Y Cooperativas (CONGCOOP) (Guatemala)
84. Deca, Equipo Pueblo, AC (Mexico)
85. Human Rights and Business Centre (HOMA) (Brazil)
86. Zambia Alliance for Agroecology and Biodiversity (ZAAB) (Zambia)
87. Afrikagrupperna (Sweden)
88. Participatory Research Action Network (PRAN) (Bangladesh)
89. Food Security Network (KHANI) (Bangladesh)
90. Centro de Estudios Humanistas de Córdoba (Argentina)
91. Agrupacion 19 de Octubre SUTEL (Uruguay)
92. Red en Defensa de la Humanidad (Ecuador)
93. Ateneo La Vaquita (Argentina)
94. Observatorio Latinoamericano de Geopolítica (OLAG) –UNAM (México)
95. Tatuy TV (Venezuela)
96. DIGNIDAD Movement (Phillipines)
97. Fundación Vía Libre (Argentina)
98. Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti/ Anti-Jindal & Anti-POSCO Movement (PPSS) (India)
99. Phlippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) (Phillipines)
100. SENTRO Nagkakaisa at Progresibong Manggagawa (SENTRO) Trade Union (Philippines)
101. Woman Health (Philippines)
102. Asociación Red de Coordinación en Biodiversidad(Costa Rica)
103. Talent Upgrade Global Concept (Uganda)
104. Acción por la Biodiversidad (Argentina)
105. Aitec France (France)
106. All India IT and ITeS Employees’ Union (India)
107. All India Online Vendors Association (India)
108. Alternative Information Development Centre (SouthAfrica)
109. Association For Promotion Sustainable Development (India)
110. Attac (Austria)
111. Attac (Espana)
112. Aufstehn.at (Austria)
113. Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw (Phillipines)
114. Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio & Communication (BNNRC) (Bangladesh)
115. Botswana Watch Organization (Botswana)
116. Canadian Community Economic Development Network (Canada)
117. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (India)
118. Centro Ecologico (Brazil)
119. Centro Internazionale Crocevia (Italy)
120. Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (South Korea)
121. Comisión Nacional de Enlace (CNE) (Costa Rica)
122. Computer Professionals’ Union (Philippines)
123. Confederation Paysanne (France)
124. Coorg Organisation for Rural Development (India)
125. ECODAWN (India)
126. Emancipate (Indonesia)
127. Ethical Consumer Research Association (United Kingdom)
128. Forum Das ONG/AIDS Do Estado De Sao Paulo (FOAESP) (Brazil)
129. Focsiv Italian Federation Christian NGOs (Italy)
130. Frente Nacional por la Salud de los Pueblos del Ecuador (FNSPE) (Ecuador)
131. Fresh Eyes (United Kingdom)
132. Gender Equity: Citizenship, Work and Family (Mexico)
133. German NGO Forum on Environment and Development (Germany)
134. Gestos (Brazil)
135. Grupo de Incentivo à Vida (GIV) (Brazil)
136. Global Justice Now (United Kingdom)
137. Green Advocates International (Liberia)
138. Grupo de Resistência Asa Branca (GRAB) (Brazil)
139. Grupo de Trabalho sobre Propriedade Intelectual (GTPI) (Brazil)
140. Grupo Semillas (Colombia)
141. Human Rights Online Philippines (HronlinePH) (Phillipines)
142. Indian Social Action Forum (India)
143. Indonesia for Global Justice (Indonesia)
144. Jamaa Resource Initiatives (Kenya)
145. Jatio Sramik Jote (Bangladesh)
146. Justiça Ambiental (JA!) (Mozambique)
147. Kairos Europe WB (Belgium)
148. Knowledge Commune (South Korea)
149. Korea SDGs Network (South Korea)
150. La Asamblea Veracruzana de Iniciativas y Defensa Ambiental (Mexico)
151. LUMEN APS (Italy)
152. National Campaign for Sustainable Development (Nepal)
153. Observatorio de Impactos Sociales de la Inteligencia Artificial (Argentina)
154. Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) (Haïti)
155. REDES-Amigos de la Tierra (FoE) (Uruguay)
156. Research and Support Center for Development Alternatives-Indian Ocean (RSCDA-IO) / Centre de Recherches et d’Appui pour les Alternatives de Développement -Océan Indien (CRAAD-OI) (Madagascar)
157. Rural Infrastructure and Human Resource Development Organization (RIHRDO) (Pakistan)
158. Sciences Citoyennes (France)
159. Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) (Uganda)
160. Sherpa (France)
161. Solifonds (Switzerland)
162. Success Capital Organisation(Botswana)
163. Sunray Harvesters (India)
164. Védegylet Egyesület (Hungary)
165. WomanHealth (Philippines)
166. Zimbabwe Smallholder Organic Farmers Forum (Zimbabwe)
167. Área Genero, Sociedad y Políticas (FLACSO) (Argentina)
168. ATTAC ACORDEM Association of Barcelona (Spain)
169. Urgewald, (Germany)
170. Vigencia (Brazil)
171. TWN, Trust (India)
172. Volkshilfe Österrei (Austria)

Annex 1

Abrief institutional history of WSIS and its follow up in relation to the proposal for a High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in two phases in 2003 and 2005, mandated two complementary but distinct policy processes; a multilateral process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ for actual policymaking, and a multistakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as a policy dialogue forum.

UN IGF was formed in 2006, and it meets annually. In 2010, the UN General Assembly (GA) set up a Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) Working Group on Improvements to the IGF. Its report was adopted by the UN GA and has been implemented. Significantly, many design elements of the now proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body─involving new kinds of more substantive policy roles for the IGF or IGF associated bodies─were expressly considered by this Working Group and rejected. It is concerning, and unacceptable, how these elements of an ‘empowered IGF plus’, having been rejected by a formal process pursuant to extensive consultations, are re-emerging through the back-door of an informal process driven by the Secretary General’s office.

The other WSIS-mandated ‘complementary’ process of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’, for actual policymaking, remained a contested issue. From 2014 to 2018, two successive CSTD Working Groups considered various ways to implement this key WSIS recommendation, but an agreement could not be reached. However, this process of exploring the appropriate architecture for Enhanced Cooperation on global digital policies is not closed. The WSIS+10 meeting in 2015 called for “continued dialogue and work on the implementation of enhanced cooperation.” This call was repeated by a UN GA resolution in 2020.

As with the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the IGF─and quite likely an extension of it─the new High-Level Multistakeholder Body would have corporation and government nominees, in addition to some technical community and civil society members, sit as equals. This is acceptable for the MAG whose role is basically to develop the program for the annual IGF. On the other hand, the proposed new High-Level Multistakeholder Body has a clear and central policy role. There is no evident reason otherwise to go beyond the current IGF and MAG structure, which has been performing well as a policy dialogue system, as mandated by the WSIS.

The current proposal appears to be a clear effort to creep from the IGF side to the Enhanced Cooperation side of the WSIS mandate, because it was the Enhanced Cooperation process, which was supposed to undertake the policy development role. It is precisely to pre-empt any such mission creep from the ‘policy dialogue’ multistakeholder IGF side to substantive policy space that the UN GA has clearly stated in its post WSIS resolutions that the IGF and Enhanced Cooperation are to be ‘distinct’ i.e. separate processes. There is, therefore, no scope for an ‘Internet Governance Forum plus model’ or to ‘enhance the Forum’ (both terms from the SG’s Roadmap document), as some kind of a hybrid between the policy dialogue function of the IGF and substantive policy function of the WSIS mandated ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ (which is supposed to be multilateral, but with multistakeholder consultations). The new High-Level Multistakeholder Body is evidently trying to become such a hybrid. This is a clear subversion of the architecture laid out by the WSIS and subsequent guidelines from the UN GA.

The High-Level Multistakeholder Body for Digital Cooperation is evidently ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ in camouflage, seeking to take over the latter’s digital policy development role. Only that it does not at all qualify for such a role from a WSIS mandate point of view, which laid out directions of what and how of such an Internet/digital policy body in its Tunis Agenda.

Once such a High-Level Multistakeholder Body dabbling in substantive policy issues is formed, it will slowly but surely seek to fill up the vacuum left by the non-creation of a democratic and multi-lateral body for the development of global Internet and digital policies. It will thus come to be at the apex of global digital governance and policy system.

Annex 2

Some quotes from documents related to the High-Level Multistakeholder Body, which show its proposed central policy role and problematic private funding model

The evident central policy function of the proposed High Level Multistakeholder Body

The report of the ‘High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation’, on which the UN Secretary General’s (SG) ‘Roadmap for Digital Cooperation’ is based, described the policy function of the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body in this fashion:

…incubate policies and norms for public discussion and adoption. In response to requests to look at a perceived regulatory gap, it would examine if existing norms and regulations could fill the gap and, if not, form a policy group consisting of interested stakeholders to make proposals to governments and other decision-making bodies. It would monitor policies and norms through feedback from the bodies that adopt and implement them.

Building on this report, the SG’s Roadmap specifically calls for:

Creating a strategic and empowered multi-stakeholder high-level body, building on the experience of the existing multi-stakeholder advisory group, which would address urgent issues, coordinate follow-up action on Forum discussions and relay proposed policy approaches and recommendations from the Forum to the appropriate normative and decision-making forum.

The part ‘strategic and empowered’ makes evident that this Body’s role would go much beyond the policy deliberation function of the UN IGF. It will have some strategic, policy-related power. ‘Address urgent issues’ is another part, which points to some kind of decision-making role, quite beyond policy deliberation. So does ‘coordinate follow-up action on IGF discussions’. How does the Body relay ‘policy approaches and recommendations’ from the IGF, when there are no avenues or means for recommendation-making in the IGF? There is obviously meant to be some ‘empowered’ role of choosing, shaping, and incubating policy approaches and recommendations by the new proposed Body.

In default of any other specific Internet or digital norms-shaping or policy-making body in the UN system, policy approaches and recommendations coming out of this proposed Multi-stakeholder High-Level Body will be presented and construed as ‘the’ global norms and soft law in the digital arena.

The private funding model for the proposed High-Level Multistakeholder Body

In this regard, the report of the ‘High-level Panel’ said:

All stakeholders─including governments, international organizations, businesses, and the tech sector─would be encouraged to contribute.

The SG’s Roadmap builds on this, to propose:

Addressing the long-term sustainability of the Forum and the resources necessary for increased participation, through an innovative and viable fundraising strategy, as promoted by the round table.

No document seems available about what got ‘promoted by the round table’. But all indications are that the focus is on non-UN, private funding. With such an alluring, high-profile digital norms-shaping and policy role, a large part of such funding would very likely come from Big Tech and other corporate sources. A proposal for how the High-Level Multistakeholder Body (HLMB) should be run developed by a Working Group of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) of the IGF─MAG itself being a strong candidate for a central role in the proposed new Body─has this to say about its funding:

“Probably, some senior people sitting in the MHLB will have a bigger incentive to consider funding the IGF Secretariat, without making this a requirement at all.”

There is more than a hint here of ‘pay to play’. All the relevant documents are generally clear about a focus on private funding, with references to how members of this body being well resourced, and providing various resources for its functions, would be such a good thing.

*Source: https://justnetcoalition.org/big-tech-governing-big-tech.pdf

UN 디지털다자협력 관련 한국시민사회 보고서 및 권고안은 아래 링크를 통해 확인하실 수 있습니다.
*URL: https://bit.ly/2wjnL0l

210307_Petition_More than 170 Civil Society Groups Worldwide Oppose Plans for a Big Tech Dominated Body for Global Digital Governance

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