STATEMENT OF THE VANCOUVER WOMEN’S FORUM

ON PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

>>> Statement [Download]

 

As sixteen delegates representing peace movements from all over the world, we have traveled from Asia, Pacific, Europe, and North America to convene the Vancouver Women’s Forum on Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula, an event held in solidarity with Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy to promote a peaceful resolution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Sanctions and isolation have failed to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and instead severely harm the North Korean civilian population. A Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons will only be achieved through genuine engagement, constructive dialogue, and mutual cooperation. We issue the following recommendations to the Foreign Ministers participating in the January 16 Summit on Security and Stability in the Korean Peninsula: 

 

● Immediately engage all relevant parties in dialogue, without preconditions, to work toward achieving a nuclear-free Korean peninsula;

 

● Abandon support for the strategy of maximum pressure, lift sanctions which have deleterious effects on the North Korean people, work toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, remove barriers to citizen-to-citizen engagement, and strengthen humanitarian cooperation;

 

● Extend the spirit of the Olympic truce and affirm the resumption for inter-Korean dialogue by supporting:

i) negotiations for the continued suspension of joint US-ROK military exercises in the south, and the continued suspension of nuclear and missiles tests in the north,

ii) a pledge not to conduct a first strike, nuclear or conventional, and 

iii) a process to replace the Armistice Agreement with a Korea Peace Agreement;

 

● Adhere to all the Security Council recommendations on Women, Peace, and Security. In particular, we urge you to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which acknowledges that the meaningful participation of women in all stages of conflict resolution and peacebuilding strengthens peace and security for all. 

 

These recommendations are based on our long experience engaging with North Koreans through citizen diplomacy and humanitarian initiatives, and from our collective expertise on militarism, nuclear disarmament, economic sanctions, and the human cost of the unresolved Korean War. The Summit is a sobering reminder that the gathered nations have a historic and moral responsibility to formally end the Korean War. A pledge not to conduct a first strike can de-escalate tensions by significantly reducing the apprehension of an attack and the risk of miscalculation that could result in an intentional or an inadvertent nuclear launch. Resolving the Korean War can be the single most effective action to halt the intense militarization of Northeast Asia, which gravely threatens the peace and security of 1.5 billion people in the region. The peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis is the key step toward the total global elimination of nuclear weapons.

 

 

January 15, 2018

Vancouver Women's Forum on Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula

Christine Ahn, Women Cross DMZ

Kozue Akibayashi, WILPF

Lisa Natividad Guahan. Coalition for Peace and Justice

Ewa Eriksson, Fortier Women Cross DMZ

Yehjung Yi, Korean Sharing Movement

Mihyeon Lee, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

Liz Bernstein, Nobel Women’s Initiative

Moon-sook Lee, National Council of Churches in Korea

Susan Bazilli, Women Peace Security Network

Nan Kim, Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea

Ellen Judd, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace

Ann Wright, Women Cross the DMZ & Veterans for Peace

Patti Talbot, United Church of Canada

Mary-Wynne Ashford, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Erica Fein, Win Without War

Lyn Adamson, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace 

 

<사진 = 밴쿠버여성포럼>

Pyeongchang Olympics and the Great Shift in Korea

 

 

LEE Seung-hwan South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association

 

 

Korean Peninsula, Spring 2018

 

The series of events that began with the participation of North Korean athletes in the Pyeongchang Olympics and the accompanying visit by the North Korean delegation headed by Kim Yeo-jeong, followed by the visit to North Korea by the South Korean delegation, completely transformed how the Korean Peninsula entered spring this year, by putting an end, at least for the time being, to the nuclear and missile experiments and military drills that had raised the tension between the two Koreas every spring. With the volatility characterizing the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula so quickly dissolved and the groundwork for the historical summits between the leaders of the two Koreas as well as between the North Korean leader and the U.S. president completed, the Pyeongchang Olympics will likely be remembered as a watershed moment in the Korean struggle for peace.

 

The background to the “nearly miraculous situation in East Asia,” as described by the Japanese government, can be found in the so-called March 5 Accord between Kim Jong-un and the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang. North Korea took the world by surprise by completely reversing its position and embracing the accord encompassing the organization of the third inter-Korean summit, the resumption of the North Korea-U.S. dialogue on the denuclearization of North Korea and the restoration of relations between the two countries, and the possible cessation, by North Korea, of its nuclear and missile experiments, contingent upon the successful continuation of dialogue with the United States. Through the accord, Pyongyang eagerly expressed its willingness to cease the nuclear and missile provocations that have fueled the escalating military tension on the Korean Peninsula and even to contribute to détente by tolerating without any changes to intensity ROK-U.S. joint military exercises slated for April.

 

Background of the March 5 Accord

 

Experts offer a number of different explanations as to the factors motivating the dramatic shift of attitude on the part of North Korea as displayed in the March 5 Accord.

 

The most widely accepted theory is that the international community’s prolonged sanctions against North Korea forced the country into accepting the terms of the accord. Notwithstanding the attendant controversies, these sanctions have been working. UN Security Council Resolution 2270 of March 2016 broadened the scope of the sanction to include comprehensive measures beyond responses to the country’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development, and significantly strengthened the intensity of sanctions exercised by China, a country that holds the key to the success of sanctions against North Korea. However, detractors of this theory argue that it is still too early to determine the true effects of these international sanctions, and that sanctions alone could not have changed Pyongyang’s policies so dramatically, given the nature of the Kim regime. These critics alternatively point to the innate change in Pyongyang’s strategy as the more direct source of the about-face displayed in the March 5 Accord. As the Kim Jong-un regime aspires to transform North Korea into a “strategic country” (with normal relations and a capability to shape the order it faces), it has had to address the reality that the extensive development of nuclear programs has failed to significantly improve the North Korean economy. In other words, it has had to embrace the opportunities for increased aid, the removal of sanctions, the signing of a peace agreement, and restoring relations with the United States even if embracing such opportunities would require the denuclearization of North Korea.

 

Even more important than the effects of sanctions and the change in the Kim regime’s strategy are the efforts being made by the Moon Jae-in government. By delaying the joint ROK-US military exercises last December, the Moon government succeeded in inducing Pyongyang’s decision to send North Korean athletes to the Pyeongchang Olympics and to accept the March 5 Accord. By responding, belatedly, to Pyongyang’s offer made in January 2014 that it would cease nuclear and missile experiments should Seoul cease the joint military exercises with the US military, the Moon government enabled Pyongyang to turn its stance around on the state of inter-Korean relations. Without the Moon government’s efforts at persuading Washington and postponing the joint military exercises, neither the sanctions nor the North Korean strategy would have led to this “nearly miraculous situations in East Asia.”

 

Why Sanctions Are Not the Cure-All Solutions to Problems Involving North Korea

 

Both Washington and the general American public view the recent development on the Korean Peninsula with a wary eye, regarding the shift in Pyongyang’s attitude as motivated by the strategic goal of increasing economic gains by putting the option of denuclearization on the negotiation table. President Trump denied that the decision to hold a summit with the North Korean leader was impromptu, but has expressed both doubts and hopes in his tweets: “May be false hope, but the U.S. is ready to go hard in either direction” and “Great progress being made, but sanctions will remain until an agreement is reached.”

 

Accordingly, the Trump administration’s new line of diplomacy with North Korea features hardliners like Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, a testament to Washington’s resolve to challenge North Korea even further with military options should its talks with Pyongyang fail.

 

The Liberal Korea Party and conservatives critical of the Moon government in South Korea, on the other hand, have blatantly characterized the change in Pyongyang’s attitude as “a mere security show put on by a hard-pressed North Korea,” expressing distrust and discontent even in the face of Washington’s new willingness to give talks a try. These detractors keep demanding sanctions as the only solutions to all problems involving North Korea, claiming that only stronger and continued sanctions would induce positive change in Kim Jong-un and lower the risk of an armed conflict.

 

Blind trust in sanctions, especially in the absence of a strategy for engagement and dialogue, can have fatal results, however. The current level of sanctions is already so high that it threatens the daily livelihood of North Koreans. Additional sanctions could backfire by tempting North Korea into accelerating its nuclear development program with a view to breaking through the uncomfortable status quo with violent actions. Unlike other countries, South Korea, too, stands to lose much from continued sanctions against North Korea. The May 24 Sanction Measures, the restriction on tourism to Mt. Kumgang, and the shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Park all intended to hurt the North Korean economy, but also ended up damaging South Korean businesses just as much. Unconditional sanctions against North Korea, in other words, presents a self-destructive strategy from the South Korean perspective that increases the risks of war. Unconditional sanctions should not form South Korea’s strategy on long-term relations with the North.

 

Trilemma of Peace on the Korean Peninsula

 

The three main goals the South Korean government seeks to achieve with the Great Shift on the Korean Peninsula are denuclearization, the establishment of a peace regime, and the continuation of the Korea-US alliance. Two of these three goals may be achieved without much conflict, but all three cannot be achieved at the same time. Until now, all the parties involved have been pursuing different goals—South Korea, the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula; the United States, the denuclearization of North Korea; and North Korea, its own rise as a “strategic country.” The three countries are now compelled to find effective measures to overcome this trilemma in order to achieve their objectives.

 

The Pyeongchang Olympics and the March 5 Accord created a new opening in this search for possible solutions to this trilemma. Pyongyang has so far sought to become a strategic country by amassing a nuclear arsenal. Through the March 5 Accord, however, it has offered to sit down for a summit with the US president and showed a willingness to make political and economic gains by giving up (allegedly) “completed” nuclear programs. Note Kim Jong-un’s remark to the South Korean delegation that North Korea “would like to be taken seriously as a partner of dialogue.”

 

Recall the five conditions of denuclearization Pyongyang demanded in an official statement released on July 6, 2016. The five conditions included in this July 6 Proposition were: (1) the disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons brought into South Korea; (2) the abolition of all nuclear weapons and their bases in South Korea; (3) the prohibition on the introduction of nuclear strike assets into the Korean Peninsula; (4) the confirmation of the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea; and (5) the declaration, by Washington, of the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea with their ability to launch nuclear weapons. The proposition repeats much of the conditions listed in the Joint Statement on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992, with the withdrawal of US troops additionally demanded. Washington has stated that it has either already satisfied or is willing to entertain the four earlier conditions. The only remaining problem between Washington and Pyongyang is therefore the latter’s latest demand that the former withdraw its troops from South Korea. 

 

Pyongyang, however, was careful to hedge its last demand, limiting the scope of troops to be withdrawn to those with the ability to launch nuclear weapons, and also demanding not the immediate withdrawal per se, but the declaration to that effect. Pyongyang, in fact, has expressed much willingness to tolerate the American military presence in South Korea at every major opportunity for negotiation. At the South-North Korean Summit of 2000, Kim Jong-il famously remarked that the US troops in South Korea should remain not as a force hostile to North Korea, but as the keepers of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

 

A Bold Proposition for the Inter-Korean and DPRK-US Summits

 

There are, in other words, a number of measures that all three parties may adopt toward solving the trilemma involving the denuclearization of North Korea, the continuation of the ROK-US alliance, and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. These include guaranteeing the security of North Korea by implementing the Joint Statement on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, guaranteeing North Korea’s entry into the international community and its prospects for future prosperity by lifting sanctions, and guaranteeing the United States’ continued influence on East Asia by agreeing to keep US troops in South Korea without nuclear capabilities. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula without the withdrawal of US troops is perhaps the best possible scenario to which both Koreas and the United States could agree. The realization of that scenario would amount to the establishment of a joint security regime involving all three countries on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. The rise of such a regime, in turn, would imply the accumulation of sincere and mutual trust among the three countries.

 

The establishment of a military alliance between North Korea and the United States, as demanded by some hardliners, would represent a more advanced form of such joint security regime. Hardliners like Hong Seok-hyeon thus demand that the Trump administration ought to work on enhancing the pro-US stance of Pyongyang by explicitly saying “No” to toppling the Kim regime, working towards the collapse of the Kim regime, accelerating the Korean unification, and moving US troops north of the 38th Parallel.

 

Once the three countries begin to develop mutual trust in one another by exercising new and bold ideas unbounded by the conventional mold of hostile relations, they will be able to maintain the impetus for denuclearization notwithstanding differences in detail. The peacebuilding process based upon such mutual trust would differ significantly from the step-by-step denuclearization and peacebuilding processes envisioned by the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005. In order to capitalize upon the current “miracle-like” opportunity created by the Pyeongchang Olympics and the Great Shift, bold actions akin to cutting the Gordian Knot are required.

 

Multilayered Approaches to North Korea and Expanding Civilian Exchange

 

The current state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula differs markedly from similar opportunities for peace that arose in the past, as the current situation requires bold actions and a firm commitment to peace. The solution required by the current situation would involve solving the major obstacles to peace on the Korean Peninsula early in the negotiation process. This, in turn, requires mutual trust and friendship among the two Koreas and the United States, which is crucial to maintain the drive for peace until the final end of the negotiation process, i.e., the permanent denuclearization of North Korea.

 

Another interesting characteristic of the current situation is that the peacebuilding process is guided in a top-down fashion with the strong commitment of the leaders involved. Given the complexity of the Korean Question and the history of distrust among the countries involved, a top-down approach involving a series of summits is crucial for solving the problems early on and establishing sufficient trust in a short span of time. At present, civilian exchange among the three countries involved would be restrained until local elections are held in South Korea in June, even all the while preparations are being made for the summits and high-level official talks.

 

Nevertheless, peacebuilding between South and North Koreas should be a multilayered process, and civilians have as important a role to play in the unification process as governments. Efforts should therefore be made in various areas in order to expand the opportunities for civilian exchange between the two Koreas shortly after the summits are held.

 

Both the South and North Korean governments, in particular, ought to address the issue of promoting exchange at multiple levels as part of the summit. Although the upcoming South-North Korean summit will mainly focus on denuclearization, peacebuilding, the evolution of inter-Korean relations, and economic cooperation with the United States, the leaders of both Koreas should not neglect the importance of restoring the ecosystem for rich civilian exchange at multiple levels. The two Korean leaders could provide a significant boost for continued and stronger civilian exchange if they embrace a written resolution to guarantee and support civilian exchange at various levels irrespective of political and military tension. By embracing such a resolution, the two Korean leaders could effectively declare their commitment to diversifying inter-Korean relations over and beyond government control.

 

 

This essay is the first essay written for the 2018 Peace Report Project of the Civil Peace Forum,

under the sponsorship of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Korea Office.

 

[2018 Peace Report] See/Download

 

Solidarity Message to <Anti-War Coalition In Solidarity to Protect Article 9>

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD) has opposed the amendment of peace constitution and rearmament of Japan by Abe administration. We are very concerned about national security bills in a bid to be passed at the National Diet of Japan.

 

Japan must be prevented from exercising the right of collective self-defense. This will nullify the Japanese peace constitution, particularly article 9, which has served as an anchor of peace in East Asia.

This year is the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. The memories of the atrocious Japanese colonial rule and aggression in the past in many of its neighboring countries cannot be simply erased.

 

Japan must stop military buildup and preserve its peace constitution.

We will continue to stand in solidarity with those who are concerned about and marching for peace across Asia-pacific.

 

Peace & Solidarity

 

Peace and Disarmament Center, PSPD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

한반도 평화 위협할 사드 배치를 반대하는 긴급 기자회견 개최

박근혜 정부는 사드 한국 배치 관련 일체의 논의를 중단하라!

일시 및 장소 : 2016년 2월 1일(월) 오전 11시 , 청와대 앞(청운동사무소)
주최 : 반전평화연대(준) 등 사드 배치를 반대하는 각계 단체들

 

지난 1월 28일(미국 현지 시각) <월스트리트 저널>은 미국 고위 인사의 말을 인용해 “한·미가 사드(THAAD)의 한반도 배치를 둘러싼 막바지 협상을 하고 있으며, 이르면 다음 주나 그다음 주에 발표할 수 있을 것”이라고 전했습니다. 이에 대해 정부는 미국한테 협의 요청을 받은 바 없다고 했지만, 최근 한미 간 물밑 협의가 급물살을 타면서 사드 배치가 조만간 가시회할 것이란 우려가 커지고 있습니다. 이미 박근혜 대통령이 지난 대국민담화에서 사드 배치에 대해 ‘안보와 국익에 따라 검토하겠다’고 말하는 등 정부의 공식 입장마저 ‘사드 배치’로 기울고 있습니다.
 
반전평화운동을 비롯한 각계에서는 그동안 사드 배치가 낳을 위험성을 경고하고 우려를 표명해 왔습니다. 사드 배치가 한반도에 살고 있는 우리를 안전하게 해주기는커녕, 더 큰 위험에 놓이게 할 것이기 때문입니다. 중국을 주되게 겨냥한 미국의 사드가 한반도에 배치된다면, 중국의 반발을 부르는 등 한반도와 그 주변 정세에 커다란 먹구름을 몰고 올 것입니다.
 
이에 반전평화연대(준) 등 사드 배치를 반대하는 각계 단체들이 공동으로 청와대 인근 청운동사무소 앞에서 긴급 기자회견을 개최합니다.

사드, 트러블메이커
THAAD, TROUBLEMAKER

레이더의 전자파는 진짜 안전할까?
북한 미사일 정말 막을 수 있을까?
당신이 궁금한 사드의 모든 것

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 바로보기 링크 >> http://bit.ly/NO_THAAD

- [카드뉴스 1편] 사드(THAAD)가 먹는 거야 입는 거야 뭐가 문제야 >> 클릭

 

We Oppose THAAD System Deployment in South Korea

 

(Seoul, 16 February 2016) After North Korea conducted its 4th nuclear test and launched a long-range rocket, the governments of South Korea and the US officially announced plans to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. We are gravely concerned about the negative impact of this planned deployment in South Korea, and strongly urge both governments to avoid deploying this weapon as it will escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and create further problems related to the North Korean nuclear issue. 

The problems we foresee include:

 

1. Escalation of Military Tension in Northeast Asia 
We note with concern that deployment of THAAD in South Korea will make this nation officially part of the Northeast Asia Missile Defense system, led by the US and Japan. This will inevitably escalate military tension between the US-South Korea-Japan and North Korea-China-Russia and the nuclear arms race in the region.

 

The US and South Korean governments continue to argue that deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea is a response to the existence of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles. However, THAAD is not an effective tool to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles targeting South Korea, due to its short range and low peak altitude.

 

Both governments also insist that China has no need to worry as THAAD radars can be fixed towards North Korea and deployed in terminal mode with low detectable range. However, a multitude of experts contend that it is easy to change terminal mode to forward-based mode, putting most Chinese territory under detectable range, regardless of THAAD’s location in South Korea. 

 

We believe the main purpose of THAAD in South Korea will be to use the AN/TPY2 radar to identify and trace in the early stages any mid- to long-range ballistic missile from China or North Korea heading to the US mainland or US army bases in Japan or Guam. Based on information provided by the South Korean government to the US and Japan, the rate of interception by the US Missile Defense strategy will increase. 

 

2. More Difficulty in Resolving Nuclear Issues on the Korean Peninsula 
We emphasize that deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea will make it more difficult to resolve nuclear issues on the peninsula, especially due to the strong opposition from China. China has been managing North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy through coordination of the Six-Party Talks and support for or even pressure on North Korea. Deployment of THAAD in South Korea will remove the motivation for China to play an active role in continuing to manage North Korea’s nuclear activity or play a constructive role in reopening the 6-party talks. In addition, rather than resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, deploying THAAD in South Korea will justify to North Korea the importance of developing the quality and increasing the numbers of its nuclear weapons to overwhelm the missile defense system. 

 

Fundamentally, the North Korean nuclear crisis is the result of hostile relations between North Korea and the US. These hostile relations on the Korean peninsula can be resolved through dialogue and negotiations between the relevant stakeholders, including North Korea and the US.  /END/
 

사드, 트러블메이커
THAAD, TROUBLEMAKER

레이더의 전자파는 진짜 안전할까?
북한 미사일 정말 막을 수 있을까?
당신이 궁금한 사드의 모든 것

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 바로보기 링크 >> http://bit.ly/NO_THAAD

 

2015-03-26 [카드뉴스 1편] 사드(THAAD)가 먹는 거야 입는 거야 뭐가 문제야

2016-02-01 [기자회견] 한미간 사드 배치 관련 논의 중단하라

2016-02-11 [성명] 국민은 안중에 없는 개성공단 폐쇄와 사드배치 논의

 

 

1.
사드, 트러블메이커
THAAD, TROUBLEMAKER

 

2.
TROUBLE 1. 초미의 관심사, 레이더의 유해성
사드의 AN/TPY-2 레이더는
X-밴드(8~12GHz)의
주파수 대역을 사용하여
고주파 전자파를 발생시켜요.

 

3.
고주파 전자파?
인체에 암을 일으킬 가능성이 있는 물질(2B)로 분류
- 세계보건기구(WHO) 산하 국제암연구소(IARC), 2011. 5. 31

 

4.
X-밴드 레이더의 위험반경
보수적으로 잡아도
전방 130도, 3.6km (약 15만 평, 축구장 약 70개)안에는
사람이 살 수 없어요.

배치 장소를 선택할 때 반드시
전자파의 위험성을 고려해야 한다는 건
미군 스스로도 인정하고 있죠.

 

100m 출입금지구역
2.4km 항공기, 전자장비 통제구역
3.6km 비허가자 출입금지구역
5.5km 항공전자폭발장비, 민간항공기 통제구역
미 육군 AN/TPY-2 레이더 운영교범, 2012. 4. 16

 

5. 
"사드는 인체와 환경에 큰 영향이 없습니다. 전자파도 100m 밖은 안전합니다." - 문상균 국방부 대변인, 2016. 2. 16.

"미군 보고서에 100m 안에서는 심각한 화상과 내상을 입을 수 있다고까지 나오는데 100m 밖은 무조건 안전하다고요?
대변인 같으면 101m에서 사실 수 있겠어요?" - SBS 김태훈 기자, 2016. 2. 16.

"그렇습니다. 다 안전조치를 하기 때문에 전혀 문제가 없습니다." - 문상균 국방부 대변인

"미군기지 주변에 가면 구토와 어지러움을 겪는다고 호소하는 이들이 있어요.
밤에는 많은 이들이 발전기 소음 때문에 잠을 잘 이루지 못합니다." - X-밴드 레이더가 설치된 일본 교토 미군기지 근처 거주 주민, 2015년 <한겨레> 인터뷰

 

6. 
전자파, 결코 괜찮지 않아요.
세계보건기구(WHO) 등이 설정한 기준은 대부분 ‘단기 노출’을 전제로 하고 있어요. 
더 큰 문제는 주민들이 장기적으로 노출되었을 때 발생하는 건강 문제죠.

 

7. 
WHO(세계보건기구)는 전자파와 관련해 ‘사전배려원칙’을 채택하라고 권고합니다. 
전자파로 인한 백혈병, 암 등은 그 피해가 심각하기 때문에,

전자파가 무해하다는 것이 최종 입증되기 전까진

최소한의 피해도 방지하기 위해 노력해야 한다는 의미.

한국 「환경보건법」의 기본이념이기도 하죠.

 

8. 
웬열~ THAADIST 후보들도 자기 지역구의 전자파는 싫은가 봐요~
- 김문수(대구 수성갑) “대구는 부적절. 사드는 평택이나 동두천 등 전방에 배치해야 유리.”
- 원유철(평택 갑) “왜 평택을 콕 집어 이야기 하는지 모르겠다.”
- 주호영(대구 수성을) “대구는 수도권과 거리가 멀어서 배치 안 된다. 대도시와 같은 인구밀집지역은 아닐 것이다."
- 유승민(대구 동구을) “사드 부지가 결정되지 않은 상황에서 배치 지역을 먼저 언급하는 것은 적절치 않다.”

 

9. 
TROUBLE 2. 레이더의 탐지거리
“사드는 대북 방어용이다. 주한미군이 배치할 레이더는

탐지거리가 600km~800km 종말모드라서, 중국과는 무관하다.” - 국방부
진짜?

 

10.
사드의 레이더는 두 가지 모드가 있어요.
탐지거리가 짧은(600~800km) 종말모드 Terminal Mode
탐지거리가 긴(최대 2000km) 전진배치모드 Forward-Based Mode

 

11. 
“레이더의 두 모드는 8시간 내에 전환이 가능하다.” - 미 국방부 미사일방어청(MDA) 2012년 예산서, 2011. 2 

네, 그냥 소프트웨어만 바꾸는 겁니다.

사드는 아직도 개발 중이니 전환 시간은 더 단축될 것이고,

주한미군이 어떤 모드로 사용하는지

한국 정부는 통제할 권한도 없어요.

 

12. 
“사드 배치에 중국은 강력한 군사 배치로 대응할 것. 한국 본토는 중국과 미국이 군사 배치를 두고 ‘바둑을 두는’ 민감한 지역이 될 것” - <환구시보>, 2016. 2. 16

“사드는 한반도 핵 문제 해결에도 도움이 되지 않을 것” 
- 알렉산드라 티모닌 주한 러시아 대사, 2016. 2. 2

 

주변국과의 갈등은 멈추지 않을 거예요.

 

13.
TROUBLE 3. 쓸 수는 있는 물건인가?

지금까지 했던 요격 테스트는 몽땅
답지를 나눠주고 본 시험일 뿐.
사드는 실제로 사용된 적도,
지상 발사 미사일을
요격해본 적도 없어요.

 

14. 
환상 속의 그대. 사드는 아직 개발이 다 완료되지도 않았죠. 결함은 줄줄이.

 

15.
“사드의 구성요소들은 지속적인 신뢰성 향상을 보여주지 못하고 있다. 실제 자연환경 하의 실험에서도 결함을 보였다.” - 마이클 길모어 미 국방부 작전시험평가국장, 2015. 3. 25

“미사일 발사대 결함, 레이더와 운영자 간 인터페이스 결함이 드러났다. 특히 발사대 문제가 지속될 경우 천문학적인 비용 부담을 유발할 것이다.” - 미 국방부 작전시험평가국(DOT&E) 연례보고서, 2016. 1

 

16. 
TROUBLE 4. 사드는 필요 없다며...

한국은 북한과 거리가 너무 가까워
멀리서 날아오는 미사일을
높은 고도에서 요격하는 사드는
북한의 미사일을 방어하는데
효용이 없다는 것
국방부도 인정해왔던 사실입니다.

 

17. 
근데 왜 이제 와서 말 바꾸니
국방부 왜 맨날 말 바꾸니

 

“한반도의 지리적 환경에서는 상층방어 MD보다 하층방어 MD가 가장 효과적. 우리 군은 상층방어를 위한 미국 MD에는 참여하지 않을 것” Before 
-> “사드와 L-SAM을 중첩적으로 운용하면 안보에 도움이 된다.” Now

 

* L-SAM : KAMD(한국형미사일방어체계)에 속하는 장거리지대공미사일로, 방위사업청이 1조 1천억 원을 들여 개발 중. 국방부는 그동안 L-SAM을 개발하고 있기 때문에 사드 도입은 안 해도 된다고 주장해왔음.

18.
TROUBLE 5. 지금 누가 웃고 있나요?

 

19. 
“사드 배치 논의는 동아시아 지역의 군사적 긴장을 높이고, 한·중·일과 주변국의 국방비 지출이 늘어나 방산업종에 유리한 환경이 만들어질 것이다. 최근 군사적 긴장이 고조됨에 따라, 실제 글로벌 주요 방산업체의 주가 상승 추세가 지속되고 있다.” - KTB투자증권, 2016. 2. 11

 

20.
I Say 핵실험,
You Say 사드!
I Say 로켓,
You Say 개성공단 폐쇄!

#반도에_흔한_적대적_공생

기다렸니? 북풍(北風)

 

21. 
KEEP CALM
AND
THAAD, NO THANKS!

#사드 #드루오지마
선거라고 함부로 막 그러는 거 아니야

 

참여연대, 2016. 2. 19 제작

 

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