Korean Government’s Disclosure of ODA Information Is Disappointing at Best

Korea discloses less information than Japan, a non-IATI member state.
With such minimal information disclosure, it is far behind to uphold the principles of openness, transparency, and sharing in government affairs.

On August 11, 2016, the Korean government announced that it became “the first Asian government” to disclose, voluntarily, information on Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) activities to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). The action seemingly amounts to a meaningful first step toward ensuring transparency in governmental development assistance according to a widely accepted international standard. However, the Korean government in fact provided nothing more than the most basic of ODA information, and has failed to meet the standard of transparency demanded by the international community.

The Korean government disclosed information on 13 of the 39 items required by the IATI, concerning the executive agencies and projects involved in ODA. Of the seven elements of the organization standard, the Korean government disclosed only the organization-identifier, name, and the reporting organization. Of the 32 elements of the activity standard, the Korean government provided 10 elements only, including title, activity-date, recipient-country, and sector. Such information is hardly enough to allow the IATI to understand Korea’s ODA projects in detail or to identify whether such projects are working effectively as intended. By contrast, Japan, an observer state of the IATI, disclosed information on 21 elements of the IATI Standard. Even if we were to concede that this year marks the first instance for Korea to implement the IATI Standard, the amount and quality of information the country has disclosed do not support the Korean government’s proud claim to be the first Asian country to do so. In Asia, Korea and Japan are the only two countries that are member states of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

It is important for both donor and recipient countries to disclose their ODA information transparently. Governments are accountable to taxpayers and therefore have the fundamental responsibility of making sure that the ODA projects, run on taxpayers’ money, do not duplicate or cause any wastes, and function as planned and intended. Disclosure of information is also critical to consolidating public support for ODA in donor countries, and enables governments of recipient countries to plan and devise their policies systematically. The level and quality of ODA information disclosed by the Korean government, however, are barely fit to achieve these purposes. It is impossible to compare and monitor the details of ODA with such minimal information only. Nor is the information enough for the governments of recipient countries to develop and implement meaningful development plans. As a member state of the IATI, the Korean government should make available a far greater range of information regarding the specific types of assistance and capital involved and the terms and conditions attached thereto.

There is a long way before Korea substantially improves the transparency and effectiveness of its ODA. In the Second Master Plan for International Development Cooperation (2016-2020), the Korean government stated that it would consider increasing the amount of information to be disclosed according to the IATI Standard. The Korean government, however, has yet to present a specific implementation plan. Considering the Korea’s ODA fragmentation it is important to disclose information about not only the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), but also all the agencies of the central government that are undertaking their own ODA projects today.

One may disclose information, but mere disclosure does not ensure the openness, transparency, and sharing of information if the disclosed information remains inaccessible. The Korean government has ambitiously launched the “Government 3.0”, aspiring toward greater transparency and sharing of public information under a new paradigm of governance. Yet the strategy remains a mere slogan in numerous governmental organizations and departments. Disclosure of information entails the duty to make the disclosed information available and accessible. Data should be provided in forms amenable to analysis and application, and via channels that are easily accessible to users. The ODA information the Korean government has provided, however, consists of attachments only, making it impossible for the general public to search and access them on the Internet. In order for Korea’s first step toward greater transparency in ODA to be more than just vain words, the Korean government must make efforts to ensure the availability, accessibility, and application of the information it provides.

한국 ODA 문제점 간과한 정부의 ‘보여주기식’ 2015 ODA 통계 발표 

미진한 ODA 규모, 효과성, 투명성은 언급없이 ‘증가율’만 강조

지난 4월 14일 국무조정실은 경제협력개발기구(이하 OECD)가 13일 발표한 개발원조위원회(이하 DAC) 회원국들의 2015년 공적개발원조(이하 ODA) 잠정통계를 들어 ‘2015년 우리나라의 원조, 전년대비 0.5억불 증가한 19.1억불 - 최근 5년간 연평균 ODA 증가율 10.2%(회원국 중 1위)’라는 제목의 보도자료를 발표했다. ‘증가율’만을 취사선택해 강조한 반면 규모, 효과성, 투명성 등 한국의 ODA가 가진 고질적인 문제점과 현실은 전혀 반영하지 않았다는 점에서 유감이다. 

정부가 간과한 문제점들을 살펴보면, 우선 양적 측면에서 한국 정부가 국제사회에 공언한 목표치에 턱없이 부족한 금액을 ODA에 할당했다는 점이다. 한국 정부의 ODA 규모는 2015년 기준 국민총소득(GNI) 대비 ODA 비율은 0.14% 정도에 그쳤는데, 이는 세계 10위권이라는 한국의 경제규모에도 맞지 않을뿐더러 한국 정부가 1차 국제개발협력기본계획(2010-2015)을 통해 스스로 밝힌 목표치 0.25%에도 현저히 미달한다는 점에서 매우 실망스러운 결과라 할 수 있다. 게다가 OECD DAC 회원국들 평균이 0.3%에 달하며 국제사회는 이미 70년대부터 GNI 대비 ODA 비율을 0.7%까지 확대할 것을 권고해왔다는 점을 고려하면 ODA 규모 증가율만을 강조한 이번 보도자료의 문제점을 더욱 확실히 알 수 있다. 그런데도 정부는 지난해 말 채택된 2차 기본계획(2016-2020)에서 공약 미이행에 대한 해명은커녕 1차 계획보다 후퇴한 목표치 0.20%를 제시함으로써 국제사회의 합의와 권고를 무시하였으며, 우리 스스로 국제사회에 한 약속을 깨는 결과를 낳았다. 

ODA의 질적 측면에서 제기되는 효과성, 투명성 문제에 대한 언급도 전혀 없었다. 한국의 ODA 사업의 대표적인 문제점 중 하나는 수출입은행과 한국국제협력단(이하 KOICA) 외에도 여러 부처와 지자체가 사업을 실시해 발생하는 분절화 문제다. 중복 지원으로 인한 예산 낭비, 일관성 결여로 인한 효과성 저하 등이 대표적이다. 최근 자료를 보더라도 한국 ODA 사업은 약 44개 기관 (지자체 12개 포함)이 산발적으로 수행하고 있는 상황이다. ODA의 투명성 역시 후퇴하고 있는 것도 문제다. 국제 원조투명성 캠페인 조직인 Publish What You Fund (이하 PWYF)에 따르면 KOICA의 2016년 원조투명성지수 (Aid Transparency Index, 이하 ATI)는 26.1%로 전체 46개 기관 중 41위를 기록했으며, 이는 2012년 39%, 2013년 27.9%, 2014년 36.9%에 비해 더 하락한 것이다. 2012년 이래 4회 연속으로 하위(poor) 그룹에 속한 셈이다. 한국이 올해 1월 DAC 회원국 중 14번째로 국제원조투명성기구(IATI)에 가입한 점은 그나마 다행이지만, PWYF의 ATI 지수가 IATI 이행과 상호 밀접한 연관이 있다는 점에서 현재 KOICA가 공개하는 자료의 수준은 다른 나라들에 비해 여전히 제한적이며 갈 길이 멀다. 

정부는 우리나라의 ODA가 국제 기준에 비추어 어느 수준에 와있는지 납세자인 국민들에게 객관적인 정보를 제공할 의무가 있다. 그러나 정부는 이번 자료에서 긍정적인 지표만을 취사선택하여 제시함으로써 보여주기식 자료 발표에 그쳤다는 한계를 나타냈다. 동 자료에서 “향후 ODA 양적 확대와 함께 ‘통합적인 ODA', '내실있는 ODA', '함께하는 ODA'라는 기본원칙 하에 원조의 질적 제고 노력을 지속해 나갈 것”이라고 언급했으나, ODA의 문제점에 대한 인식 없이 과연 이러한 노력이 가능할지 의문이다. 최근 채택된 제2차 기본계획에 ODA 규모 확대 방안이나 분절화 극복 방안이 제시되지 않았다는 점도 이러한 의문을 뒷받침한다. 정부가 진정 ODA의 질적, 양적 개선을 희망한다면 이미 시민사회 및 학계 등이 수차례 지적한 바 있는 ODA 정책의 근본적 개선과제를 2차 기본계획은 물론 향후 추진방향에 반영하는 것이 우선이다.  
 

The Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy dam project which takes the whole life of the people of Laos: For whom was the development designed?

 9th August 2018

The accident of the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy dam in Laos on the 23rd of last July has resulted in the death of 34 people and left approximately 100 people missing. 13,067 from 13 towns have been affected by the accident and amongst them, 7,095 from 6 towns which were directly damaged and hit. Considering the fact that the flooded water from the dam has reached the Cambodian border, the total damages have exceeded the level of expectation.

This should not be treated as a simple accident. The benefit from the development was exploited by the big enterprises and the government, and the locals who have less power suffered from the consequences of the risks. A whopping 90 percentage of the electricity produced from the dam was supposed to export to Thailand and never meant to be consumed in Laos. From the beginning of this project, it has never been for the sake of the people of Laos. Claiming to serve a role as ‘the battery of Asia’ by carrying out excessive numbers of hydropower dam projects, the Laos government was going to enjoy the financial profit. Also, SK Engineering and Construction (SK E&C), the main constructor, and Korean Western Power KOWEPO), the operator for the next 27 years, were all along set to taste the sweetness from the development. The local residents in the dam-constructing sites were left with the painful bitterness from having the environment destroyed and being displaced from their ancestral homes. As it was not enough, they lost their beloved families, and their homes have been demolished. We cannot help but asking for whom this development was designed.

The Korean government also takes responsibility for this tragedy. The Xe Pian/Xe Nam Noy project was jointly promoted with the Korean government and enterprises. This was the first Public Private Partnership (PPP) sponsored by Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) from the Export-Import Bank of Korea as a Korea’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea extensively advertised this project as a new model of financial conglomerates combining ‘an aid’ and ‘an exportation’. ODA is constructed with the tax raised by the citizens for the purpose of ending poverty in developing countries and implementing humanitarianism around the globe. However the project in Laos, instead, took thousands of people’s homes causing hundreds of cases of missing people and over tens of people’s death.

Therefore we demand the Korean government and enterprises who are responsible for the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy dam accident follow below.

First, the Korean government must perform the truth-finding mission of the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy hydropower dam with sincere responsibility. It was announced that the Laos government will organize the Investigation Committee of the Accident in order to look into the cause of the accident thoroughly, and will ask for the cooperation of the Korean government and the Thai government in the process. SK Engineering and Construction (SK E&C) claims that the cause of the accident is the overflow of the subsidiary dams due to heavy rainfall whereas Korea Western Power (KOWEPO) accounts for the collapse of the subsidiaries, which shows the reasons why an accurate investigation regarding the cause of the accident is utterly necessary. In addition, the process of location-selecting, planning, and building and the evaluation of its environmental and social effects should be examined so that possible wrongful aspects in those stages can be fully revealed. In order to extend the outcomes of the truth-finding investigation from a simple revelation of the cause to the stage where the rehabilitation and the prevention of additional damages or the re-occurrence are promised, the participation of the representatives of the affected towns, local NGOs and the international civil organizations, including Korea’s, must be guaranteed along with the transparency over the whole investigation process.

Second, the Korean government and SK E&C should provide long-term plans for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas that were damaged. Because of the accident, the citizens of Laos have lost a great deal including not only their families but also their homes and means of living. This cannot be resolved by emergency relief. The long-term plans for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas must be guaranteed and implemented by both the Korean government and SK E&C.

Third, the Korean government should study the limitations and problems of its activation policies regarding the PPP (Public Private Partnership) and establish its countermeasures. There have been numerous worries regarding the act of the companies who focus on profits without complying with social responsibilities and corporate ethics. This could hurt the purpose of development cooperation projects, which is to solve poverty and to contribute to the development in partner countries, by damaging the environment and the residents’ right to exist. Nevertheless, the Korean government has not prepared a code of conduct or a system for companies to follow when they participate in these development and cooperation projects. The accident is the very proof that the development cooperation projects, which seek only profits without considering the demands and needs of the community, could actually endanger many people's rights to survive and to live. Such a disaster would not have occurred if the voice of the local residents were heard when they expressed their concerns since the beginning of the project. This tremendous disaster should arouse the Korean government to review its policy of activating public-private cooperation projects.

Fourth, the Korean government should fully mandate the implementation of Safeguard, the primary system for preventing environmental, social and human-rights damages of large development projects and for protecting the rights of local residents. According to the EDCF Safeguard, it is stated that Safeguard is useful but not compulsory. If Safeguard is not mandatory, it is only nominal. Even if the responsibility for implementation is placed on the partner countries, the accountability cannot be fulfilled unless the Korean government manages and supervises the implementation process. A complete investigation should apply to the projects that have already started in order to ensure that they comply with Safeguard. Furthermore, it should be determined whether the Korean Safeguard operated at the field so that they do not adversely affect human rights and the environment. Possible improvements should be also considered. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed its concerns in 2017 regarding not considering or demanding human rights related matters when Korea`s public financial institutions provided financial aid. The Korean government should introduce a Human Rights Impact Assessment according to this recommendation, which is to take further steps from the environmental and social impact assessments. In addition, relevant information such as project feasibility reports and environmental and social impact assessment reports should be transparently made public. 

That is the minimum responsibility to ensure that such tragic accidents do not happen again.

We will actively cooperate with the people of Laos and local organizations and urge a thorough truth-finding investigation into the cause of the accident. We will also continue our activities to improve legal and institutional mechanisms in the development and cooperation sector for sustainable development of the partner countries.

The Coordinated Response Team of the Korean Civil Societies for the Xe Pian-Xe Nam Noy Dam Collapse

Energy & Climate Policy Institute / Korean Federation for Environmental Movement/ KTNC Watch / PEACE MOMO / People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy / PIDA / Truth Foundation

* [Joint Statement] See/Download

* Korean Version >> Click